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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States is a country dominated by celebrity, and the line 
between fame and everyday American life continues to blur.1  Everyday 
people are becoming famous through vehicles such as reality television.2  
 
 1. David Carr, Major Stars Not So Crucial as Concept Trumps Celebrity, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 2003, at A1 (discussing the transition from using “A-list” celebrities in 
television and film to concept-based programming, especially reality television). 
 2. Describing this situation, the Hartford Courant stated, “Ordinary people are the 
stars of reality television . . . .”  Editorial, California Dreamin’, HARTFORD COURANT, 
Aug. 8, 2003, at A10, available at 2003 WL 59295643.  Reality shows can create new 
celebrities or attempt to revive old celebrity careers.  Shows such as “Survivor” and “The 
Bachelor” (and “The Bachelorette”) make celebrities of ordinary people thrust into 
unusually eventful situations.  See Digest, ‘Bachelor’ Couple Inks with Paradigm, 
HOLLYWOOD REP., July 15, 2003, at 8, available at 2003 WL 57154323 (discussing “The 
Bachelor” winners signing with agency to concentrate on endorsement deals).  
“American Idol” promises a recording contract to an ordinary person selected by 
celebrity judges and an audience vote.  Winners of the show, such as Kelly Clarkson, 
become instant celebrities complete with endorsement deals.  See Carla Hay, Fashion 
Houses Strike a Chord with Pop Stars, BILLBOARD, Oct. 4, 2003, at 1 (explaining Kelly 
Clarkson’s endorsement deal with Candie’s shoes); Natalie Zmuda & Brian Russak, 
Mediabank, Clarkson Unveiled, FOOTWEAR NEWS, Sept. 8, 2003, at 4, available at 2003 
WL 60593875 (explaining the same, and adding that Clarkson and Candie’s are 
discussing producing a Kelly Clarkson signature shoe). 
Additionally, hosts of these shows are becoming celebrities.  For example, consumers 
recently voted “Queer Eye for the Straight Guy” “fashion maven” Carson Kressley as the 
most influential celebrity endorser on their shopping decisions, more influential than 
Michael Jordan, Paris Hilton, or Ben Affleck.  Rob Owen, TV Notes, Simon to Help 
Judge ‘Idol’s’ World Contest, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 8, 2003, at B8, available 
at 2003 WL 64518690 (discussing results of a survey conducted by public relations firm 
Jericho Communications of 2654 shoppers in major metropolitan areas). 
Moreover, reality shows will feature celebrities past their prime in an attempt to revive 
their careers (and the public’s recognition of them).  For example, “The Surreal Life,” 
which aired on the WB network, followed the lives of 80’s rock icon Vince Neil, early 
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“A-list” celebrities, while still important, are finding themselves surrounded 
by ordinary people turned famous.  The New York Times recently noted 
that celebrities have been defined “down to the guy or girl next door, 
riveting consumers who secretly hope to be the stars of their own 
movies.”3  As a result, the contours of what a celebrity is continually 
broadens.  If “the first ‘Bachelor’ and his would-have-been bride”4 and 
ordinary people turned stars like them are afforded the same protection 
as traditional celebrities, litigation will certainly increase.5 
Meanwhile, the law dealing with celebrities’ trademark protection and 
First Amendment defenses is splintered within and among the federal 
circuits.6  When a celebrity takes issue with use of his or her name or 
image in artistic works used in commerce, such as popular music or film, 
First Amendment concerns arise.  Creation of a message, by its nature, 
conflicts with attempts to control that message.7  As a result, First 
 
90’s rapper MC Hammer, 80’s actor Gary Coleman, and others, during their stay 
together in a resort house.  See Eric Deggans, The New Celebrity Standard, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003, at 1E, available at 2003 WL 56481388 (discussing the 
masses of “past-their-prime celebrities” trying to appear on reality shows in the hopes of 
jump-starting their careers, and how appearing on a reality show is a good way to launch 
a career). 
 3. Carr, supra note 1, at A18; cf. Pelton v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 
4342, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3825, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2001) (denying Lanham 
Act suit because the plaintiff was not a recognizable celebrity even though she claimed 
to be an internationally known model).  In Pelton, the plaintiff agreed to be 
photographed for a surfing magazine.  Id. at *3–4.  The defendant later used her photo on 
its vitamin supplement packaging without her permission.  Id. at *5.  The court 
dismissed her Lanham Act claim, finding that a reasonable consumer would not 
recognize the plaintiff and therefore would not falsely associate her with endorsement or 
sponsorship of the product.  Id. at *10. 
 4. “The first ‘Bachelor’ and his would-have-been bride: Does anyone even 
remember their names?  Doesn’t matter.”  James H. Burnett III, Celebrities Wear Out 
Welcome with Overexposure: Ben and J-Lo, Please Go, MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, May 
9, 2003, at 10E, available at 2003 WL 3323846.  While reality shows suffer this sort of 
backlash, their continued popularity presents a new set of celebrities created with every 
television season.  With this ever-expanding group of celebrities comes more potential 
for litigation. 
 5. See Privacy and Publicity: New Developments in Media Law, METROPOLITAN 
CORP. COUNS., Sept. 11, 2003, at 4 (discussing Spike Lee’s suit against Spike TV for 
trademark infringement as “part of an expanding amount of litigation initiated by 
celebrities to protect the commercial use of their names and the commercial value of 
their personas”); Cathy J. Frankel, In Star-Struck America, Broader Protection Sought by 
Celebrities, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7, 2000, at 9 (“[M]ore and more celebrities are becoming 
plaintiffs, asserting claims under a variety of legal theories.”). 
 6. Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of 
Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 482 (2003). 
 7. See id. at 479. 
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Amendment free speech rights inherently conflict with attempts to 
exclude one’s name from others’ speech—that is, controlling a message 
and its content.8  Courts must determine the extent to which an artist’s 
First Amendment right of free speech renders various legal regimes 
inapplicable.  In the trademark context, the federal courts have used at 
least three different tests, and variations on those tests, to balance these 
interests: likelihood of confusion,9 alternative avenues,10 and the Rogers 
v. Grimaldi balancing test.11  These tests are applied in place of the 
statutory likelihood of confusion test to balance the First Amendment 
interests involved.  Only Rogers explicitly recognizes the First Amendment 
issues, while the other two tests primarily focus on the celebrity’s rights. 
Unclear rules breed uncertainty, and that uncertainty limits expression.  
Musicians, filmmakers, and artists risk expensive and prolonged 
litigation every time they use a celebrity’s name or image in a work, no 
matter what relevance they contend it might have to their message.12  
 
 8. Joshua Waller, Comment, The Right of Publicity: Preventing the Exploitation 
of a Celebrity’s Identity or Promoting the Exploitation of the First Amendment?, 9 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 59, 59 (2001). 
 9. The Ninth Circuit sometimes applies the standard likelihood of confusion test 
to cases involving literary titles.  See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 
F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting injunction against book using Dr. Seuss’s 
trademarks to parody another subject because “serious questions” existed as to whether 
the claimed parody created a likelihood of confusion). 
 10. The Eighth Circuit applied the alternative avenues test in several instances.  
See Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 401–03 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding 
merchandise parodying Mutual of Omaha logo infringing).  The Second Circuit adapted 
the test from Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972), in Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979), but 
changed its approach in Rogers.  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 11. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999–1000 (holding that a movie entitled “Ginger and 
Fred” did not infringe actress Ginger Rogers’s trademark rights in her name because the 
title contained minimal artistic relevance to the film’s content and was not explicitly 
misleading as to film’s source).  The Second and Sixth Circuits routinely apply Rogers, 
although sometimes the Sixth Circuit applies it in different ways.  Compare Parks v. 
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that a rap song using 
civil rights icon Rosa Parks’s name as its title had “highly questionable” artistic 
relevance, and overturning a judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003), with ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 920–
21 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a lithograph portraying golfer Tiger Woods’s victory at 
the Masters Tournament did not infringe on trademark rights in his name and image 
under Rogers), reh’g denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19044 (6th Cir. 2003).  The Ninth 
Circuit distinguished Dr. Seuss and applied Rogers where a potentially infringing use 
parodied the trademark used, instead of using the trademark to make fun of something 
else.  Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that song entitled “Barbie Girl” parodied Mattel’s product, instead of using Mattel’s 
trademark to parody something else, and therefore did not infringe under Rogers), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003). 
 12. See Waller, supra note 8, at 81–82 & nn. 184–85 (discussing several attorneys’ 
real world assessment of the situation as requiring either celebrities’ permission or use of 
something entirely different in order to avoid liability). 
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While major label musicians and their record labels, such as the rap group 
OutKast, LaFace Records, and, ultimately, media giant Bertelsmann, 
have the resources to risk expensive litigation to use a celebrity’s name 
in a title, the vast majority of potential users do not.13  Imagine a local 
rock band that wants to use a celebrity’s name in a song’s title.  Most 
musicians have neither the resources of a high profile record label, nor 
the notoriety to make litigation worthwhile.14  Short of risking litigation, 
artists will be forced to settle by using different representations in their 
works, even if the substitution takes away from the overall composition.  
The net effect of this inconsistent treatment is to chill speech by artists 
unwilling or unable to take this chance.15  Given the inconsistent treatment 
 
 13. OutKast entitled a song “Rosa Parks,” for which Rosa Parks, the civil rights 
icon, filed claims of misappropriation, Lanham Act section 43(a) infringement, right of 
publicity violations, and other state law claims.  Parks, 329 F.3d at 441–43.  The 
Supreme Court denied OutKast’s petition for certiorari in December, 2003.  LaFace 
Records v. Parks, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003).  In September, 2004, CBS News reported that 
Parks has dementia and that her attorneys objected to requiring her to answer questions 
in the case.  Lawyer: Rosa Parks Has Dementia, CBSNEWS.COM, (Sept. 22, 2004), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/08/national/main587389.shtml?CMP=ILC-
SearchStories (last visited Nov. 24, 2004). 
At the time of the Parks case, OutKast’s label, LaFace Records, had a distribution 
agreement with Bertelsmann.  Parks, 329 F.3d at 442.  Bertelsmann is one of the world’s 
largest global media companies, “so big, [that] it needs space in the bookcase, CD rack 
and magazine stand.”  Bertelsmann AG, HOOVER’S COMPANY PROFILES (Sept. 15, 2004), 
at 2004 WL 94095915.  The label is now involved in a joint venture called Sony BMG 
Music Entertainment between two media monsters, Bertelsmann and Sony Music.  Sony 
BMG Music Entertainment, HOOVER’S COMPANY IN-DEPTH RECORDS, (Sept. 29, 2003), 
at 2004 WL 95248811.  One can venture a guess that the celebrity in that case, Rosa 
Parks, was actually the smaller entity. 
Conversely, the litigants in Mattel were giant corporations battling over trademark use 
in a song title.  In Mattel, the unknown pop group Aqua faced Lanham Act infringement 
claims from Mattel, Inc. over a song entitled “Barbie Girl.”  Two defendants in Mattel 
were media giants that produced and distributed the song: MCA Records, and Universal 
Music Group, the one of the world’s largest music publishing companies.  See Mattel, 
296 F.3d at 899; Universal Music Group, HOOVER’S COMPANY PROFILES, Sept. 29, 2004, 
at 2004 WL 95247238.  Judge Kozinski noted the litigants’ size in Mattel by stating that 
if the case “were a sci-fi melodrama, it might be called Speech-Zilla meets Trademark 
Kong.”  Mattel, 296 F.3d at 898.  Not surprisingly, unknown bands without the resources 
of a monster record label at their disposal would not have the ability to litigate these 
claims, and must either settle them immediately or steer clear of possibly legal (but 
trademarked) titles. 
 14. Cf. Parks, 329 F.3d at 437 (involving well-known rap duo OutKast, signed to 
LaFace Records and affiliated with Bertlesmann); Mattel, 296 F.3d at 899 (involving 
Danish band Aqua, unknown in the United States, signed to MCA Records and affiliated 
with Universal Music Group). 
 15. Judge Kozinski stated, “Much useful social and commercial discourse would 
be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time 
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and potential for increased litigation in this area, courts must apply a 
standard test for trademark infringement as it relates to celebrities’ 
names and images, in order to preserve artists’ First Amendment rights. 
In Part I, this Comment will address both artistic and entertainment 
industry issues relating to using celebrity names and images in creative 
works.  Part II will discuss the relationship between state right of 
publicity and privacy claims, and federal trademark law.  Part III will 
discuss the Lanham Act’s history and purpose, including its traditional 
applications and recent amendments.  Part IV will address the First 
Amendment issues raised when creative works use celebrities’ names 
and images.  Part V will address the three tests courts use to balance 
section 43(a) Lanham Act claims and First Amendment rights.  Part VI 
will advocate the consistent use of the Rogers test as a low threshold to 
remove artistic works from the trademark regulation regime. 
II.  BACKGROUND: TITLES AND IMAGES IN THE                               
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 
The title is an integral component of any expressive work.  Titles have 
two purposes: “to catch the eye and to promote the value of the 
underlying work.”16  Ordinary trademark infringement requires labels to 
refrain from misleading or confusing the public as to the good’s source.  
Consumers are protected insofar as they can identify what they buy. 
Unlike labels of ordinary commercial goods, titles of artistic works do 
not serve to identify the manufacturer.17  Rather, consumers would expect 
the title to be associated with a work’s content.18  They can usually 
identify its creator on the work’s face or by its packaging.  For example, a 
CD package would typically identify the musician somewhere on the 
packaging, but consumers would not look to the song titles for that 
 
they made reference to a person, company or product by using its trademark.”  New Kids 
on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 
Parks v. LaFace Records, 76 F. Supp. 2d 775, 781 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (quoting Guglielmi 
v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1979), and discussing the 
“inevitabl[e] chill” on free speech if artists must justify their use of celebrities’ 
identities), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 925 (2003); Mark A. Lemley,  The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common 
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1713 (1999) (blasting current expansive trademark 
litigation’s “suppress[ion of] social, political, or artistic speech that happens to include 
the trademark”); Lee, supra note 6, at 500 (urging the rejection of the Rogers balancing 
approach because it “lacks substantive content and encourages uncertainties, which may 
chill speech by themselves.”) 
 16. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902. 
 17. Id. 
 18. In re Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 616 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (holding that a book’s title 
cannot be trademarked because the title is not indicative of its source). 
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identification.19  Consumers can determine some element of the work’s 
content from its title, although they should know better than to judge a 
book solely by its cover.20  Creative works, or their titles including a 
celebrity’s name, could imply endorsement or involvement.  The three 
tests—likelihood of confusion, alternative avenues, and the Rogers 
balancing test—are used to determine whether this type of use is 
permitted under the false endorsement section of the Lanham Act, 
section 43(a), in light of First Amendment freedom of speech.21 
III.  RELATION BETWEEN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND TRADEMARK LAW 
Celebrities use both state and federal causes of action to prevent 
unauthorized use and protect their economic investment in their 
identities.  Primary federal claims are under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act for false advertising or endorsement, and for dilution under section 
43(c).  Right of publicity is the broadest and most frequently litigated 
state law claim.  Right of publicity is entirely a state law claim.  States 
have varying statutory and common law schemes.22  Unlike the right of 
privacy, based in the right of an individual to be left alone, the right of 
publicity protects an individual’s name or likeness from being 
commercially appropriated by someone else.23  Whereas a right of privacy 
claimant does not want exposure at all, a right of publicity claimant 
asserts that he or she “simply wants to be the one to decide when and 
where, and to be paid for [the exposure].”24 
When the right of publicity conflicts with the First Amendment, courts 
resolve the tension under principles specific to each state right.  Some 
 
 19. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902 (“A title tells us something about the underlying work 
but seldom speaks to its origin.”). 
 20. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 21. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 157–215. 
 22. ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, 1 LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, 
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS, § 1:118, at 1-431 (2d ed. 2004). 
 23. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 127–30, 134 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(concerning limited public figure’s right of privacy and publicity claims against 
pornographic magazine for falsely identifying her as nude woman in photograph); see 
also LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 22, § 1.118, at 1-429 to 1-430.  The right of privacy 
is credited to a seminal article in the Harvard Law Review.  See Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see also Melville 
B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954) (expanding 
on Warren and Brandeis’s right of privacy to explain a new right of publicity for 
celebrities). 
 24. Lerman, 745 F.2d at 134; see LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 22, § 1:118, at 1-
429 to 1-430 (discussing differences between the torts). 
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states, such as California, recognize both common law and statutory 
rights of publicity, which may differ in application.25  Trademark and 
right of publicity claims are similar in that each grants the celebrity the 
right to protect an economic interest in his or her name.26  The crucial 
difference between the two claims is that right of publicity focuses on 
the individual’s rights instead of consumers’ rights.  Right of publicity 
violations do not require likelihood of consumer confusion.27  Additionally, 
celebrities can (and often do) assign their right of publicity, in gross, to 
studios.28  Trademark rights cannot be similarly assigned because trademark 
rights derive from use in commerce and are not property rights in the 
traditional sense.29 
IV.  HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF THE LANHAM ACT 
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or 
device or any combination thereof” used by any person “to identify and 
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, 
 
 25. California Civil Code section 3344 states: “Any person who knowingly uses 
another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in 
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising . . . without such person’s 
prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons 
injured as a result thereof.”  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).  See White v. Samsung 
Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing the difference between 
California’s statutory and common law right of publicity, and distinguishing between the 
protection of identity under the common law right and likeness under the statutory right). 
 26. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (comparing 
Parks’s false advertising/trademark claim with her right of publicity claim) (citing 
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983)), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003). 
 27. Id. at 460; see also Henley v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 589, 
591–92, 597 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that musician Don Henley’s right of publicity 
violated by department store advertisement showing henley shirt with phrase “This is 
Don’s henley” because the phrase identified Henley in the minds of consumers).  In 
California, the plaintiff does not need to be a celebrity or prove actual damages for 
recovery of statutory damages under section 3344.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.  Recovery 
by non-celebrities is considered recovery under an invasion of privacy theory because 
use of an ordinary person’s name is violative of his right to be left alone.  KNB Enters. v. 
Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 n.6 (Ct. App. 2000).  Celebrities recover under a 
right of publicity theory because the celebrity’s interest is harmed more by the damage to 
the property interest in their names than any injury from not leaving them alone.  Id. 
 28. See, e.g., Aucoin Mgmt., Inc., v. Neil’s Fads, Inc., No. 78-70971, 1979 WL 
1076, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 1979) (copyright suit by assignees of rock band KISS’s 
right of publicity); see also 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND 
PRIVACY § 5:12, at 417–18 (discussing nonapplicability of trademark “anti-Assignment-
in-Gross Rule” to right of publicity) [hereinafter MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY]. 
 29. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 28:13 at 28-16 to 28-17 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter MCCARTHY, 
TRADEMARKS]. 
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even if that source is unknown.”30  The Lanham Act protects resource 
expenditures to develop identification for a product.  It allows producers 
to exclude others from using that identification, at least to the point that 
consumers could be confused as to the product’s source.31 
To win a trademark infringement action, a plaintiff must prove both 
validity of the mark and infringement upon it.32  Validity of the mark is 
established by showing that the mark specifically identifies one company’s 
goods from another.33  A registered trademark is presumed valid.34  
Infringement is established by showing that another party used the mark 
in a manner that is likely to confuse consumers as to the source of the 
goods.35 
Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1946 attempting to create a 
federal law prohibiting unfair competition.36  Specifically, the legislature 
intended section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), to be a 
“federal anti-false advertising statute . . . .”37  The Act prohibits use of a 
trademark that could result in consumer confusion, mistake, or deceit as 
to the origin of the mark.38  The Lanham Act’s purposes are to: (1) allow 
customers to identify a product’s manufacturer or sponsor, and (2) 
enable producers to differentiate the product from others on the market.39  
 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000); see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 
763, 768 (1992). 
 31. Tara J. Goldsmith, Note, What’s Wrong with this Picture? When the Lanham 
Act Clashes with Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 
829 (1997); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000). 
 32. Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 
726 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Echo Travel, Inc. v. Travel Assocs., 870 F.2d 1264, 1266 (7th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 33. Platinum Home Mortgage Corp., 149 F.3d at 726; see also 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a) (2000). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2000); see also U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Basic 
Facts about Trademarks: Should I Register My Mark?, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
tac/doc/basic/register.htm (last modified Nov. 8, 2004). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (likelihood of consumer confusion establishes infringement). 
 36. Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 229 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 
1275 (“There is no essential difference between trade-mark infringement and what is 
loosely called unfair competition.”)). 
 37. 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 27:14, at 27-25. 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 39. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1102 (S.D. Cal. 1998), 
aff’d, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998); Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M 
Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[The Lanham Act’s] 
purpose is to prevent consumer confusion regarding a product’s source . . . .”) (citing 
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986)).  
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Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act40 protects registered trademarks, while 
section 43(a) applies to unregistered marks.41 
A.  Survey of Lanham Act Sections, Remedies, and Amendments 
1.  Section 43(a) 
 
From its inception in 1946 until 1963, section 43(a) laid virtually 
dormant.42  Early judicial interpretation of section 43(a) severely limited 
its application.  Courts limited the meaning of origin to goods’ geographic 
origin.43  In 1963, the Sixth Circuit broadened origin to include goods’ 
manufacturing source.44  Narrow interpretations of standing and 
misrepresentation also limited the usefulness of the section.45  
Subsequent case law broadened each of these standards, resulting in 
decades of increased litigation under section 43(a).46  The Trademark 
Law Revision Act of 1988 codified the likelihood of confusion test as 
 
It “enable[s] those that fashion a product to differentiate it from others on the market.  In 
that way producers create goodwill with consumers.  The device used to protect both 
groups is a trademark.”  Centaur Communications, 830 F.2d at 1220 (citing Int’l Order 
of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000). 
 41. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). 
 42. 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 27:7, at 27-13. 
 43. See Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 
1963) (acknowledging both interpretations of “origin,” and adopting the broader view 
that included protection from false designation of manufacturing source); see also 4 
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 27:14, at 27-25. 
 44. See Azoff, 313 F.2d at 408. 
 45. Some early cases held that standing under section 43(a) required the plaintiff to 
be the sole source of the goods in question.  See Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures 
Corp., 186 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1951) (holding that trustees of Samuel Clemens’s 
estate could not enjoin use of name Mark Twain in film because they did not have 
exclusive right to use the name).  But see Cano v. A World of Difference Inst., No. C 95-
03291 CW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8161, at *51 (N.D. Cal May 31, 1996) (stating that 
Chamberlain had been limited to palming off cases, and disapproved to the extent that it 
suggests that false advertising is not actionable under the Lanham Act).  See also 4 
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 27:8 n.1, at 27-16 (discussing these cases). 
 46. Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat’l Sales, 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949) 
(finding the Lanham Act to apply only to certain misrepresentations, not false 
advertising generally), aff’d, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950), superseded by statute as 
stated in Kasco Corp. v. Gen. Servs., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 29, 34 (D. Mass. 1995).  Kasco 
announced that the 1988 amendments to the Lanham Act had “consigned Samson Crane 
and its progeny to the dustbin of First Circuit jurisprudence.”  Kasco Corp., 905 F. Supp. 
at 34.  Kasco cited Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 1992), 
amended by 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 27031 (9th Cir. 1992), where singer Tom Waits 
recovered under California’s right of publicity law when his voice was imitated in an 
advertisement as an example of the nationwide trend of cases moving away from Samson 
Crane’s limitations on actionable misrepresentation under the Lanham Act and allowing 
section 43(a) claims for false endorsement.  Kasco Corp., 905 F. Supp. at 33; see also 4 
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 27:8 & n.2, at 27-16 to 27-17. 
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the crucial inquiry in a trademark infringement claim.47  By the mid 
1980s, holders of unregistered trademarks could file a section 43(a) suit 
with virtually the same rights as registered trademark holders.48 
The Lanham Act protects marks possessing at least a threshold level 
of distinctiveness, so that it distinguishes the goods it identifies from 
others.49  The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the Second Circuit’s five 
categories of distinctiveness in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.50  
In order of increasing distinctiveness, these categories are: (1) generic, 
(2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) fanciful.51 
Generally, the level of protection corresponds to the distinctiveness of 
the mark.  Generic marks are not protected at all. A mark is generic 
when it is one that is commonly used and does not identify any 
particular source.52  Generic marks “refe[r] to the genus of which the 
particular product is a species.”53 
A descriptive mark “specifically describes a characteristic or an 
ingredient of a product.”54  A descriptive mark is not inherently distinctive 
because it is a “poor means of distinguishing one source of services from 
another,”55 and therefore cannot be registered at its inception.  It can, 
however, acquire secondary meaning by “becom[ing] distinctive of the 
 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000); see Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988); see also 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra 
note 29, § 27:18, at 27-33. 
 48. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment); see 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 27:14, at 
27-28. 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2000) (denying protection for merely descriptive or 
wholly functional terms); see also Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo 
Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining distinctiveness requirement). 
 50. 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).  The distinctiveness categories originated in 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 51. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768. 
 52. Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 
1986) (citing A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 
1986)); Gimix, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 699 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1983); Miller 
Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977); Abercrombie 
& Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9. 
 53. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768 (quoting Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & 
Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9)). 
 54. Liquid Controls Corp., 802 F.2d at 936 (citing A.J. Canfield Co., 796 F.2d at 
906–07; Gimix, Inc., 699 F.2d at 906; Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 
366, 378 (7th Cir. 1976)). 
 55. Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 
727 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Liquid Controls Corp., 802 F.2d at 936 (quoting M.B.H. 
Enters. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 54 (7th Cir. 1980))). 
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applicant’s goods in commerce.”56  Once it has acquired this distinctive 
meaning, the mark may be registered or can be protected without 
registration.57 
Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful terms are automatically entitled to 
protection because each type of mark is inherently distinctive.58  A 
suggestive term requires “imagination, thought and perception to reach a 
conclusion as to the nature of goods.”59  Suggestive terms are not truly 
descriptive of the product on the one hand, but not truly fanciful on the 
other.60  Arbitrary terms are common words used in an unfamiliar way to 
describe a product, while fanciful terms are words invented for the sole 
purpose of identifying a good.61 
Typically, section 43(a) Lanham Act claims arise as commercial 
trademark holders’ actions against potentially infringing competitive 
uses.  The key infringement question is whether the public is likely to be 
confused by the similarity of the marks.62  For example, in Platinum 
Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Financial Group, Inc.,63 Platinum 
Home Mortgage filed a section 43(a) action against Platinum Financial 
Group over the use of the word “platinum” in the company’s name.64  
The court considered whether consumers would be confused by the 
defendant’s use of the term “platinum” in a related business.  It found 
 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)–(f) (2000); see Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769. 
 57. Registration has both practical and legal benefits: constructive notice that the 
registrant owns the mark, presumption for registrant that he has the right to nationwide 
use of the mark on or in connection with goods or services named in the registration, 
ability to bring an action in federal court, the use of the U.S registration as a basis to 
obtain registration in foreign countries, and the ability to file the U.S. registration with 
the U.S. Customs Service to prevent importation of infringing foreign goods.  U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, Basic Facts about Trademarks: Should I Register My 
Mark?, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/doc/basic/register.htm (last modified 
Nov. 8, 2004). 
 58. Platinum Home Mortgage Corp., 149 F.3d at 727 (citing Two Pesos, Inc., 505 
U.S. at 768). 
 59. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United 
Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)), overruled as stated in 
N.Y. Racing Ass’n v. Perlmutter Publ’g, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 578, 580–81 (N.D.N.Y. 
1997) (finding that Abercrombie classifications should not act exclusively to determine 
whether trade dress has acquired secondary meaning, and applying the test from 
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1005 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 60. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 10. 
 61. Id. at 11 n.12. 
 62. See 15 U.S.C § 1125(a) (2000). 
 63. 149 F.3d at 722. 
 64. Id. at 725; see also A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 
F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing section 43(a) suit by manufacturer of 
“Miraclesuit” swimwear against manufacturer of “Miracle Bra” swimwear); Parks v. 
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Platinum Home Mortgage 
Corp. as a typical section 43(a) service case, and A&H Sportswear, Inc. as a typical 
section 43(a) product case), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003). 
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“platinum” to be a descriptive mark, which requires secondary meaning 
for protection.65  The court found that Platinum Home Mortgage could 
not establish secondary meaning in its name and thus dismissed the 
action.66 
The Lanham Act entitles holders of trademarks, registered or 
unregistered, to injunctive and monetary relief.67  Circuit courts are split 
as to whether the plaintiff must show actual confusion to recover 
damages.68  Nevertheless, damages are typically inadequate for continuing 
infringement because irreparable harm is often presumed to result from 
infringement.69 
Trademark holders initially seek preliminary injunctions to stop 
continued infringement.  Once a preliminary injunction is obtained, 
defendants in entertainment cases often settle.  Preliminary injunctions 
can be extremely costly to infringers when major entertainment projects 
are involved.70 
 
 65. Platinum Home Mortgage Corp., 149 F.3d at 728 (citing Mil-Mar Shoe Co. v. 
Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153, 1157 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 66. Id. at 729. 
 67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116–1117 (2000). 
 68. It appears that the majority rule is that actual confusion is required.  See Res. 
Developers, Inc. v. The Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 139 (2d 
Cir. 1991); see also 5 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 30:74, at 30-139.  But 
see Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 543, 575 
(D.N.J. 2003) (rejecting Resource Developers in the Third Circuit and not requiring 
actual confusion for damages), aff’d, 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 1410 (2004). 
 69. See Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 608 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Koppers Co., Inc. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 849 (W.D. Pa. 
1981) (“[A] finding of irreparable injury ordinarily follows when a likelihood of 
confusion or possible risk to reputation appears.”); Jordan K. Rand, Ltd. v. Lazoff Bros., 
Inc., 537 F. Supp. 587, 597 (D.P.R. 1982); Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, 
Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 753 (8th Cir. 1980) (“A finding of tendency to deceive satisfies the 
requisite of irreparable harm.”); see also 5 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 
30:2, at 30-6 to 30-8. 
 70. A good example of the potential cost of entertainment industry injunctions was 
demonstrated by a suit against the film, “Devil’s Advocate.”  In this case, sculptor 
Frederick E. Hart claimed that the film copied his bas-relief sculpture “Ex Nihilo,” 
which was installed in the main entrance of the Washington National Cathedral, in the 
film without his permission and in a manner that “desecrated his work.”  Brooke A. 
Masters, Va. Judge Tells Filmmaker to Settle Suit or Halt Video, WASHINGTON POST, 
Feb. 11, 1998, at B2; Lawrence Siskind, The Devil’s Advocate, 20 LEGAL TIMES, at 23 
(Mar. 23, 1998).  The court issued a deadline for settlement after which it would issue a 
preliminary injunction, temporarily halting distribution of over 400,000 videotapes of the 
film.  Warner Brothers studio said the injunction would cost the studio and video stores 
over $42 million.  Masters, supra, at B2; see also K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright 
Infringement and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the 
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In order to receive a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit, a 
plaintiff must show either a combination of probable success on the 
merits and possibility of irreparable injury, or the existence of serious 
questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tips 
sharply in his favor.71  Irreparable injury is presumed in trademark cases 
once likelihood of success is shown.72  Depending on the jurisdiction, 
likelihood of success is established by showing likelihood of confusion, 
alternative avenues for the message, or lack of artistic relevance under 
Rogers.  These tests accommodate the First Amendment defense to some 
degree, either explicitly or implicitly, so no additional First Amendment 
inquiry is necessary. 
2.  Dilution 
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) established a federal 
cause of action when a junior use “‘whittl[es] away the value of a 
trademark’ when it’s used to identify different products.”73  The dilution 
amendment was adopted to “protect famous trademarks from subsequent 
uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, 
even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion.”74 
Dilution claims apply only to famous marks.75  Famous marks are a 
subset of trademarks that are also protected by traditional infringement 
claims.  While every trademark is, by definition, distinctive, either inherently 
or through acquiring secondary meaning, very few are famous.76  
Section 43(c) includes a noninclusive eight factor test to determine 
whether a mark is famous.77  These factors include, for example, duration 
 
Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 173, 188–90 (2000) 
(discussing case). 
 71. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 72. Id. at 1205 n.4 (quoting Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t 
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Metro Publ’g, Ltd. v. San Jose 
Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir.1993))); see also Playmakers, LLC v. ESPN, 
Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1280 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (citing rule), aff’d, 376 F.3d 894 
(9th Cir. 2004); Int’l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 827 (9th Cir. 
1993) (citing rule). 
 73. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 
4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, §§ 24:67, 24:70 (Supp. 2001)), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1171 (2003). 
 74. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 2 (1995). 
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). 
 76. “By definition, all ‘trademarks’ are ‘distinctive’—very few are ‘famous.’”  
Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 890 n.6 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting 4 
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 24:91 (2004)). 
 77. Under Lanham Act section 43(c)(1), a court can consider the following factors 
to determine a mark’s famousness: 
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; 
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and geographical extent of use and the public’s degree of recognition.  
By providing protection only for famous marks, courts can reasonably 
infer that the infringer had heard of the mark.  Thus, initially, dilution 
protected only the most famous of celebrities, like Madonna or Michael 
Jordan.78  However, as in section 43(a) cases, celebrity rights are 
creeping into the realm of once protected areas, and litigation under the 
FTDA is expanding to less famous people.79  Federal dilution law does 
not preempt state dilution statutes; therefore, a local celebrity might not 
qualify as a famous mark under the FTDA but may still have a remedy at 
state law.80 
Dilution takes two forms: blurring and tarnishment.  Blurring occurs 
when another party’s unauthorized use of a trademark weakens the 
mark’s distinctive ability to identify and distinguish its source.81  A 
 
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods  
  or services with which the mark is used; 
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; 
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; 
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; 
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of  
  trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the  
  injunction is sought; 
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and 
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the  
  Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
 78. See Steven M. Cordero, Note, Cocaine-Cola, the Velvet Elvis, and Anti-
Barbie: Defending the Trademark and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons, 8 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 599, 644–45 (1998) (suggesting that dilution requires 
“tertiary meaning,” or symbolic meaning beyond descriptive attributes and secondary 
meaning, achievable only by cultural icons such as Barbie and Coca-Cola). 
 79. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 1698–99 (discussing “doctrinal creep” and 
expansion of FTDA’s application).  In addition to the FTDA broadening protection for 
less famous celebrities, some states recognize the concept of niche fame, thereby further 
broadening the dilution claim’s scope.  See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 
125 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1281 (D. Or. 2001), aff’d, 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002).  Niche 
fame means either that the trademark qualifies as famous only in a specific geographic 
area, or that it is only famous within a particular industry.  See id. (state dilution law 
applies to marks famous within Oregon). 
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995) (“It is important to note that [the federal 
dilution statute] would not pre-empt existing state dilution statutes.  State laws could 
continue to be applied in cases involving locally famous or distinctive marks.”) (footnote 
omitted).  However, federal trademark registration, as opposed to claimed use, acts as a 
complete bar to state trademark dilution claims.  Id. at 5. 
 81. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 306 n.30 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing 
Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996)), aff’d 
without opinion, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, 
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trademark is tarnished when a secondary use creates negative 
associations in consumer’s minds.82  Examples of tarnishment include 
association with products of poor or cheap quality or unsavory subject 
matter, such as pornography.83 
Dilution applies whether or not the trademark users compete and 
regardless of the likelihood of confusion.84  Thus, dilution shifts trademark 
protection’s focus to the trademark holder’s injury.  As Judge Kozinski 
stated in Mattel, “[b]y contrast to trademark infringement, the injury 
from dilution usually occurs when consumers aren’t confused about the 
source of a product.”85  Thus, uses that would not constitute infringement 
could be dilution.  The three tests used to balance section 43(a) claims 
and First Amendment rights are therefore inadequate to address dilution 
claims because of the claims’ opposite foci.  Judge Kozinski noted that 
because dilution does not require a showing of consumer confusion, it 
“lacks the built-in First Amendment compass” of traditional trademark 
actions.86 
Dilution applies only to uses in commerce.  In Mattel, the court found 
that the “noncommercial use exception” from the FTDA applies to any 
speech that is not purely commercial.  The court determined that the 
song “Barbie Girl” was not purely commercial in nature, and thus was 
 
supra note 29, § 24.94, at 24-192. 
 82. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(describing tarnishment under the New York dilution statute by stating, “[t]he sine qua 
non of tarnishment is a finding that plaintiff’s mark will suffer negative associations 
through defendant’s use”). 
 83. See, e.g., Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949–50 
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding adult website operator’s use of “King VelVeeda” likely 
tarnished Kraft’s “Velveeta” registered trademark), modified, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21317 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116, 118 (W.D.N.Y. 
1989) (comedian’s use of stage name “Kodak” tarnished Eastman Kodak’s trademark 
because it “unquestionably brings to mind” the trademark, and associated it with a comic 
act that made references to sex and bodily functions, and used crude, off-color language 
repeatedly). 
 84. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (providing “Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, and 
Kodak pianos” as actionable examples of dilution). 
 85. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003).  The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) House of 
Representatives report quotes the following explanation of differences between 
traditional infringement and dilution: 
   Dilution is an injury that differs materially from that arising out of the 
orthodox confusion.  Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark 
may be debilitated by another’s use.  This is the essence of dilution.  Confusion 
leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to 
spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (quoting Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 
1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
 86. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905. 
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fully protected from FTDA claims.87  This is particularly important in 
the entertainment industry.  If dilution applied to commercial music and 
movies, an explosion of litigation could occur, contesting uses of famous 
product names in song lyrics, films, or titles.  Since consumer confusion 
isn’t required, a claim would lie in any artistic work using the 
trademark—a dangerous situation for any artist.88 
3.  Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
The second Lanham Act amendment broadening celebrity protection 
is the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).  The 
ACPA prohibits the registration of an internet domain name that is 
identical, confusingly similar, or dilutive of a trademark with bad faith 
intent.89  Congress approved this amendment in order to prevent 
cybersquatting—the practice of registering domain names containing 
trademarks, then profiting from selling these domain names to the 
trademark holders.90  Celebrities such as Julia Roberts,91 Madonna,92 and 
others regained domain names containing their names in suits against 
alleged cybersquatters.93  Like dilution claims, these rights derive from 
 
 87. Id. at 906–07. 
 88. This is not to say that celebrities are cut off from FTDA claims in many, if not 
most, situations where a name or image has been used.  The key question for the court 
will be whether the use is “purely commercial.”  Cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807–11 (Cal. 2001) (using transformative use test in 
copyright case to determine whether use had sufficient artistic elements to be separable 
from celebrity image used on t-shirt), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002). 
 89. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). 
 90. For a discussion of issues relating to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and 
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, see David H. Bernstein et al., 
Trademark and Unfair Competition Issues, 614 PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, 
AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK 203, 247–85 (2000), available at WL 614 
PLI/Pat 203; see also Jeffrey J. Look, Law and Order on the Wild, Wild West (WWW), 
24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 817, 825–28 (2002) (discussing varying results in 
celebrity litigation over domains registered by cybersquatters). 
 91. Roberts v. Boyd, No. D2000-0210 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. May 29, 
2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2004). 
 92. Ciccone v. Parisi, No. D2000-0847 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. Oct. 12, 
2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2004). 
 93. But see Sumner v. Urvan, No. D2000-0596, para. 6.1–.6 (World Intellectual 
Prop. Org. July 24, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/ 
html/2000/d2000-0596.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2004) (complaint by entertainer Sting 
denied against registrant of sting.com, noting that Sting did not register his name as a 
trademark, the word sting is commonly used in the English language, and that the dispute 
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an individual’s property interest in a name.  Claims do not require a 
showing of consumer confusion as to the individual’s involvement in the 
website.94 
B.  Celebrity False Endorsement Lanham Act Claims 
Section 43(a) protects unregistered trademarks.95  Since the mid-
1980s, courts have increasingly recognized celebrities’ claims under the 
Lanham Act as unregistered trademarks protected by section 43(a).96  
While some commentators see this expansion as an out of control 
overapplication, courts continue to recognize these claims.97 
1.  Unauthorized Use of Name 
A name not registered as a trademark must have secondary meaning 
for Lanham Act protection because names are not inherently 
distinctive.98  Some courts, however, seem to substitute celebrity status 
 
resolution system was not designed to protect “personality rights” apart from trademarked 
words).  This case shows the limits of international internet law.  Query whether Sting 
would be protected under a state right of publicity statute, which would likely protect 
Sting’s persona in addition to his name.  Cf., e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 
971 F.2d 1395, 1398–99 (9th Cir. 1992) (protecting Vanna White’s “identity” under 
California common law right of publicity), amended by 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
 94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)–(d) (2000) (showing neither section adopts the section 
43(a) likelihood of confusion standard for infringement). 
 95. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). 
 96. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing Rosa 
Parks’s standing to sue under section 43(a) because celebrities hold a property interest in 
their identities akin to commercial trademark holder), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 
(2003); see also 2 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 13:2 & nn.1–2, at 13-3 to 
13-4 (Supp. 2002) (explaining that names are descriptive marks, protectable only upon 
acquiring secondary meaning through long association of a name with a business, at 
which point the name and business become synonymous in the public mind). 
 97. See 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 27:14 n.5, at 27-27. 
 98. Relatedly, a name cannot be registered as a trademark, and thereby be 
protected under section 32(1), if it is “primarily merely a surname.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1052(e)(4) (2000). 
McCarthy offers two rationales for the secondary meaning requirement under section 
43(a).  First, names are analogous to descriptive marks.  They are not inherently 
distinctive because “[t]he known multiplicity of similar personal names may make 
consumers hesitant to assume a common source for products bearing a particular name.”  
2 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 13:3 n.1, at 13-6.1 (2004).  Like 
descriptive marks, names must acquire secondary meaning through commercial use in 
order to be protected.  Second, sellers should not be prevented from honestly describing 
their products.  Because names can describe a product’s source, this attribution should be 
allowed to designate that source when used truthfully.  Id. at § 13:3, at 13-6.1 to 13-6.2; 
see also Ferguson v. Maita, 162 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (citing McCarthy 
and requiring secondary meaning for section 43(a) protection for law firm’s name 
containing personal name); Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 125 (4th 
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for the secondary meaning requirement.99  Courts view the celebrity’s 
name as a property interest bestowed upon the celebrity as a result of the 
individual’s fame.100  In these cases, courts ask whether or not the plaintiff 
is a celebrity, not whether consumer confusion exists.  This property-
based formulation of trademark rights shifts the focus of whether a name 
is protected from rights earned through use of the mark to an inherent 
right given to a famous individual.101  This approach is more akin to 
right of publicity cases, where the underlying tension between property 
rights in one’s persona and the First Amendment is pronounced. 
2.  Unauthorized Use of Image and Relation to Copyright 
Celebrities’ images are typically covered by the Copyright Act and 
right of publicity.  The basic idea of copyright is conceptually opposite 
to trademark.  A copyright protects a tangible creation for its expression 
of ideas.  Trademark protects something existing in the world for its 
user, whose use associates that thing with him.102  Although names 
cannot be copyrighted, tangible representations of celebrities’ images are 
often copyrighted.103  For example, a photograph of a celebrity could be 
 
Cir. 1990) (requiring secondary meaning for personal name protection under federal and 
Maryland trademark laws). 
 99. See, e.g., Parks, 329 F.3d at 447 (recognizing Rosa Parks’s property right in 
her name because she is a celebrity, thereby constituting a valid trademark protected by 
section 43(a)); Vanderbilt v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc., No. 88 CIV. 8263 (SWK), 
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3342, at *1–4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1990) (finding representation 
of Alfred Vanderbilt II in Rolls-Royce commercial falsely implying his endorsement of 
the car actionable under Lanham Act without showing of secondary meaning based on 
celebrities’ commercial investments in their names for product endorsements and 
building a career); Condit v. Star Editorial, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1054 (E.D. Cal. 
2003) (stating that the Lanham Act only applies to individual’s identities that function 
akin to a trademark). 
 100. “[C]ourts routinely recognize a property right in celebrity identity akin to that 
of a trademark holder under § 43(a).”  Parks, 329 F.3d at 447 (citing Landham v. Lewis 
Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2000)); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 
1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing singer Tom Waits’s interest in his voice, as a 
“purported endorser” of Frito-Lay products as akin to a trademark holder’s economic 
interest), amended by 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 27031 (9th Cir. 1992); Allen v. Nat’l 
Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding the same regarding 
Woody Allen’s commercial interest in building his name’s drawing power). 
 101. Lemley views granting celebrities such expansive property rights as destructive 
to free speech because it permits them to curtail speech they do not like and want to 
suppress, or collect money for it.  Lemley, supra note 15, at 1713. 
 102. Keren Levy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Conflict Between Constitutional and 
Intellectual Property Interests, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 425, 428–29 (2001). 
 103. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2001) 
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copyrighted.  A photographer would typically own the rights to his 
photograph regardless of what is in it.  Selling the photograph to a 
publication would transfer those rights in the photograph.  Typical copyright 
issues related to celebrities include suits over use of film clips,104 graphic 
artwork,105 and musical compositions.106  Courts are reluctant to extend 
trademark protection to copyrightable materials in an effort to prevent 
circumvention of the limited nature of copyrights.107 
Right of publicity, discussed later in this Comment, protects the 
celebrity’s ability to exclusively control his name, image, likeness and 
(sometimes) voice, and prevent others from imitating or copying them to 
endorse products.  Right of publicity claims involving images often 
apply copyright concepts.108  Conceptually, this makes sense.  Right of 
publicity protects the physical manifestation of a copyrightable photograph.109  
For example, in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., the 
California Supreme Court considered whether a reproduction of The 
Three Stooges’ likenesses on t-shirts constituted commercial or artistic 
 
(citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
1.01[B][1][c], at 1-23 to 1-24 (2004)) (stating that names and images are part of a 
persona protected by the right of publicity, whose protection is not preempted by the 
Copyright Act because the persona, unlike a photograph of a person, is not 
copyrightable); see also Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 661 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
Texas tort of misappropriation protecting name, image, or likeness was not preempted by 
Copyright Act because Congressional reports showed desire to keep state privacy and 
publicity laws intact). 
 104. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 
2000), amended by 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1421 (9th Cir. 2000).  The owner of 
intellectual property rights in the Three Stooges filed this action against New Line 
Cinema for use of a Three Stooges clip in the film, The Long Kiss Goodnight.  Id. at 594.  
Comedy III Productions argued that the clip was “particularly distinctive” of the Three 
Stooges’ style of comedy, and thus the clip constituted a trademark.  The court rejected 
this attempt to classify the cause of action as trademark infringement, seeing it as an 
attempt to circumvent copyright law by use of the Lanham Act.  Id. at 595.  The court 
found that a copyright claim would have failed if it had been brought since the film’s 
copyright had expired and it had entered the public domain.  Id. 
 105. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2000). 
 106. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).  The history of musical compositions as copyright 
is as old as copyright law itself.  For an interesting summary of copyright cases based on 
musical composition, see Columbia Law Library Musical Copyright Infringement Archive, 
at http://library.law.columbia.edu/music_plagiarism/index2.html (2002). 
 107. See supra note 104.  But see Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 61–62 
(2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that some works, including graphic designs and musical 
compositions, can identify goods as trademarks even though they are clearly protected 
by copyright law). 
 108. See LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 22, § 1.118, at 1-432 (noting that the 
traditional copyright analysis covering transformative uses is “creeping” into right of 
publicity cases). 
 109. The Comedy III court notes that, at least theoretically, the right of publicity and 
copyright law share a common goal of “protecting the creative fruits of intellectual and 
artistic labor.”  Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002). 
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speech in a state statutory right of publicity claim.110  The court used 
some aspects of copyright analysis to determine whether an artist’s 
creation could be protected on its own—apart from the Three Stooges’ 
images.  While warning against the wholesale importation of the fair use 
doctrine of copyright law into the right of publicity, the court found the 
“transformative use” test typical in copyright claims to be relevant to its 
analysis.111  The court applied this concept to devise a “significant 
transformative element” test for the right of publicity.  This requires the 
artist to go beyond “literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for 
commercial gain,” and add significant transformative elements to the 
work in order to claim First Amendment protection.112  These elements 
could include parody, factual reporting, or fictionalized portrayal, and 
range from “heavy-handed lampooning” to “subtle social criticism.”113  
This leading case demonstrates the influence of copyright principles on 
other related celebrity claims.114 
As a general rule, a person’s image cannot function as a trademark.115  
However, when a specific image of an individual is consistently used to 
identify goods or services, it functions as a trademark and can be 
protected as such.116  In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., golfer 
Tiger Woods’s exclusive marketing firm, ETW Corporation, filed 
Lanham Act and right of publicity claims against an artist who sold 
limited edition lithographs of Woods winning the Masters golf 
tournament.  ETW claimed that Woods’s likeness is protected as a 
 
 110. Id. at 800–01. 
 111. Id. at 808. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 809.  The court cites the Parks District Court decision as an example of 
“fictionalized portrayal”—a characterization with which the Parks Court of Appeals 
decision apparently did not agree.  Id.  A fictionalized portrayal would certainly have 
artistic relevance under Rogers, while the Court of Appeals did not find such relevance.  
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452–56 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
925 (2003). 
 114. See also Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003) (applying 
Comedy III transformative use test to find permissible use of musicians Johnny and 
Edgar Winter in “Jonah Hex” comic book).  But see Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 
S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (declining to apply Comedy III when professional hockey 
player Tony Twist filed right of publicity claim against Spawn comic book creator when 
a villain in the book shared Twist’s name because the test fails to protect from exploitive 
uses if expressive, transformative components exist in the work), cert. denied, McFarlane 
v. Twist, 124 S. Ct. 1058 (2004). 
 115. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003), reh’g 
denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19044 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 116. Id. at 923 (citing Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
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trademark.  The court disagreed.  Woods’s status as one of the most 
photographed sports figures of his generation did not entitle him to a 
“sweeping claim to trademark rights in every photograph and image” of 
him.117  The court reasoned that no reasonable consumer would believe 
that every picture of Woods originated with him.118  He is not “a walking, 
talking trademark.”119  Therefore, his image cannot be protected as a 
trademark unless a particular image serves the trademark function of 
source designation or endorsement.120 
3.  Propertization of Trademark Results in Need to Define “Celebrity” 
Under the property conception of trademark discussed above, a 
plaintiff claiming to be a celebrity for the purposes of trademark 
infringement must have been a celebrity at the time of infringement in 
order to have standing.121  The Lanham Act protects against economic 
injury, so plaintiffs must have an economic interest in their names at the 
time of infringement for it to be actionable.  Potential for commercial 
interest at a later time is insufficient.122 
Trademark protection of a famous name may not end even with the 
celebrity’s nonuse of this name for extended periods of time.  For 
example, basketball Hall of Famer Kareem Abdul-Jabbar filed a Lanham 
Act claim against General Motors for using his long unused birth name, 
Lew Alcindor, as the answer to a trivia question in an Oldsmobile 
commercial.123  Typically, a trademark can be abandoned by lack of use 
in interstate commerce.124  According to the Ninth Circuit, however, 
names cannot be abandoned in the same manner as standard commercial 
trademarks.125  The court recognized a birth name as an integral part of 
one’s identity, neither bestowed upon him for commercial purposes, nor 
 
 117. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 923; see also Pirone, 894 F.2d at 583 (trademark 
holder of words “Babe Ruth” not entitled to enjoin use of Babe Ruth photographs unless 
photographs indicate source or origin); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp 1339, 
1364 (D.N.J. 1981) (stating that estate of Elvis Presley could not enjoin all uses of 
photographs, image, or likeness under Lanham Act unless it designated origin). 
 118. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 922. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Condit v. Star Editorial, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048, 1051 (E.D. Cal. 
2003) (stating that Carolyn Condit lacked standing for false association claim against 
Star tabloid for its article “Condit’s Wife’s Agony,” explicitly representing it as “her 
own story,” because she was not a celebrity and did not have an economic interest in her 
identity). 
 122. Id. at 1051. 
 123. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 124. 2 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 17:9, at 17-11 (2004). 
 125. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 412.  This appears to be the only section 43(a) case 
addressing the potential of name abandonment as a defense. 
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kept alive by commercial use.126  While the court did not determine 
whether General Motors’ use of Abdul-Jabbar’s name in the commercial 
constituted endorsement, it held that General Motors could not assert 
abandonment as a defense.127  Again, finding a special property attribute 
in names acknowledges the different treatment given celebrity names. 
If a one-time celebrity is no longer famous, is the property right these 
courts find to be vested in his name also lost?  Courts have not addressed 
whether the property interest endowed in a celebrity can be lost when the 
individual is no longer a celebrity.  This situation is distinguishable from 
Abdul-Jabbar, where the individual remained a celebrity, but did so 
under a different name. 
Many celebrities’ most valuable asset is their name, image, or other 
distinctive attribute.128  Especially after a celebrity stops performing, 
endorsements or other engagements become a primary income source.129  
As a result, retaining celebrity status for the purposes of trademark 
protection can become a crucial determination for a one-time celebrity.  
Marginal celebrities’ ability to retain this property right is important to 
retaining their endorsement value in the future. 
For example, consider the song “Bette Davis Eyes” (referred to as a 
permissible use of Bette Davis’s name in Rogers)130 and its singer, Kim 
Carnes.  “Bette Davis Eyes” won Carnes a Grammy in 1981.131  Following 
this success, she produced several minor hits, recording her final 
Billboard Top 20 hit in 1985.132  A song entitled “Kim Carnes” at the 
height of her popularity would certainly implicate the Lanham Act 
because the public would likely associate her with the song.  Assuming 
Carnes’s property interest is vested in her and does not require use, as 
characterized by the Abdul-Jabbar court, Carnes’s protection would be 
the same in 2004, or 2054, because her property right in her name could 
not be abandoned.  If she endorsed products in the meantime, those 
endorsements would constitute a use in commerce, keeping her rights 
alive regardless of what conception of her right is used. 
What if Carnes is no longer a celebrity?  Between 1991 and 2004, 
 
 126. Id. at 411. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Frankel, supra note 5, at 9. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 131. Eric Gelman et al., Rocking Video, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 18, 1983, at 96. 
 132. Steve Huey, Kim Carnes, ARTISTDIRECT.COM, at http://www.artistdirect. 
com/nad/music/artist/bio/0,,412166,00.html#bio (last visited Nov. 29, 2004). 
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Carnes did not release any new albums.133  A court disagreeing with 
Abdul-Jabbar and holding to traditional trademark formulations of 
abandonment could find that a thirteen-year lapse in using a name 
commercially to identify any new product could result in abandonment 
of trademark rights in her name.  Stated differently, the court would 
remove her celebrity status, thus revoking the property interest the 
Abdul-Jabbar court would have found to be endowed in her name.  
Carnes would then be required to establish secondary meaning in her 
name.  Without use in trade for thirteen years except to identify her 
earlier albums, she would not likely be able to establish secondary 
meaning.  As a result, and without the property right some courts 
attribute to celebrities’ names, Carnes’s name would no longer have 
Lanham Act protection.134 
C.  First Amendment Defense 
The level of First Amendment protection a use receives depends on 
the type of speech containing the mark.  Commercial speech, such as 
advertising, receives some protection under the Central Hudson test.  
Artistic speech is fully protected.  Commercial music and movies 
present more difficult analyses. 
1.  Attributes of Pure Commercial Speech 
In cases of pure commercial speech, section 43(a) protects celebrities 
from use of their names in a manner that would falsely imply their 
endorsement of a product.  “[T]he ‘core notion of commercial speech’ is 
that it ‘does no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”135  
 
 133. Steve Huey, Kim Carnes, ARTISTDIRECT.COM, at http://www.artistdirect.com/ 
nad/music/artist/card/more/0,,412166-1,00.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004). 
 134. Note that this is not really a problem after all.  If Carnes is using her name for 
endorsements, she would retain protection by using it in commerce.  If she isn’t, and so 
much time passes that no one will know that she’s famous, then she’s not really losing 
anything of value anyway.  That is, who would hire an endorser that no one will 
recognize?  (Until she appears on The Surreal Life, thus magically resurrecting her 
celebrity status.  See discussion supra note 2.) 
 135. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)).  In Hoffman, Los 
Angeles Magazine published a digitally altered photograph of actor Dustin Hoffman 
from the film “Tootsie,” dressed in designer women’s clothing for its “Fabulous 
Hollywood Issue!”  Id. at 1183.  The court found that the photograph was entitled to full 
First Amendment protection because it was not pure commercial speech.  Id. at 1184–86.  
Alternatively, the court found that it would be protected under Comedy III’s right of 
publicity “significant transformative element” test for artistic speech.  Id. at 1184 n.2. 
The definition of commercial speech has fluctuated.  In Central Hudson, the Supreme 
Court broadened the commercial speech definition to include “expression related solely 
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 
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Advertising is the classic example of commercial speech.  However, 
speech does not lose its protection simply because the speaker spends 
money on it.136  Commercial speech is subject to diminished First 
Amendment protection under Central Hudson.  Under Central Hudson, 
commercial speech cannot be restricted unless a four-part test is met: (1) 
The speech must concern lawful activity that is neither false nor 
misleading; (2) the asserted government interest must be substantial; (3) 
the restriction must directly advance the substantial government interest; 
and (4) the restriction must not be more extensive than necessary to 
advance that interest.137 
2.  Attributes of Pure Artistic Speech 
Artistic speech receives full protection under the First Amendment.  
The First Amendment “looks beyond written or spoken words as 
mediums of expression,”138 and protects music,139 visual art,140 pictures, 
films, and drawings.141  These expressions are protected even if they do 
 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 
U.S. 1, 11 (1979); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363–64 (1977); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen’s Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).  In 
Bolger, the Court reverted to asking whether the speech proposed a commercial 
transaction to determine whether it was commercial.  Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (citing Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human 
Relations Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973))).  In Board of 
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, the Court announced that the 
proposal of a commercial transaction was “the test for identifying commercial speech.”  
Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–74 (1989) (emphasis 
added); see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422–24 (1993) 
(explaining the development of commercial speech protection). 
 136. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 35–59 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 384; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 266 (1964)). 
 137. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.  For a discussion of the 
interplay between the right of publicity and commercial speech, see Waller, supra note 8, 
at 59 (suggesting that the Central Hudson analysis is the proper current test to balance 
commercial speech and the right of publicity). 
 138. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995) (allowing parade organizers to choose messages displayed in their 
parade as a protection of their First Amendment rights). 
 139. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (stating that City’s 
right to regulate performers at public forum based on noise restrictions was subject to 
First Amendment protection for performers). 
 140. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding New York 
City regulations strictly limiting sale of visual art violative of First Amendment), aff’d 
without opinion, 216 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 141. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973); see also ETW Corp. v. 
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not have a “narrow, succinctly articulable” message.142  Selling expressive 
materials does not diminish their First Amendment protection.143  The 
problem in most of these cases is that celebrities’ names or images are 
used in works generally considered to be artistic, such as songs or 
movies, and used commercially.144 
3.  Popular Music and Movies Combine Commercial                                    
and Artistic Elements 
Movie titles present a clear example of judicial trouble classifying 
types of speech for purposes of First Amendment protection.  Rogers 
created a hybrid category of speech relating only to using celebrity 
names in creative works.145  In Rogers, the court considered whether a 
filmmaker’s use of the title “Ginger and Fred” violated the Lanham Act 
by creating the false impression that Ginger Rogers endorsed the film.146  
Recognizing the difficulty in distinguishing artistic and commercial 
speech in celebrity cases, the Rogers court determined that titles and the 
artistic works they identify are of a “hybrid nature.”147  “Movies, plays, 
books, and songs are all indisputably works of artistic expression and 
deserve protection.  Nonetheless, they are also sold in the commercial 
marketplace like other more utilitarian products, making the danger of 
consumer deception a legitimate concern . . . .”148  The court acknowledged 
Central Hudson’s restrictions on regulation of commercial speech.  
Noting the similarity between titles and ordinary commercial goods, the 
court stated: “The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of 
peas, has a right not to be misled as to the source of the product.”149  
However, the title of an artistic work does not identify its source in the 
same manner as a can of peas.  The commercial and artistic elements of 
a title and a work are “inextricably intertwined,” so a title can 
permissibly have artistic significance and be fashioned in such a way as 
 
Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924–25 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing First Amendment 
protection for lithograph of Tiger Woods). 
 142. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (noting that such a requirement would not protect the 
“unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or 
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll”). 
 143. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 925 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g 
Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988)). 
 144. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing 
the interplay between commercial and artistic elements of speech in these cases). 
 145. Id. at 999.  The Second Circuit later expanded Rogers to apply in any case of 
artistic expression clashing with the Lanham Act, including parody.  Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. 
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 146. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997. 
 147. Id. at 998. 
 148. Id. at 997. 
 149. Id. at 997–98. 
BESER.DOC 8/21/2019  3:32 PM 
[VOL. 41:  1787, 2004] False Endorsement or First Amendment? 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1813 
to sell more copies.150 
At least one court treated a movie title as commercial speech when the 
injunction sought related only to the film’s title, not its content.  In 
American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Productions, Inc.,151 a 
Minnesota District Court considered whether New Line’s film “Dairy 
Queens” infringed on American Dairy Queen’s trademarked name.  The 
court distinguished Rogers by finding that because the New Line film’s 
content lacked an artistic connection with the famous name “Dairy 
Queen,” the title itself constituted commercial speech.152 
4.  Blurry Restrictions Defeat First Amendment Purposes 
The two distinct, commonly acknowledged purposes of the First 
Amendment are: (1) “‘[T]o preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas’ 
and to repel efforts to limit the ‘uninhibited, robust and wide-open’ 
debate on public issues”; and (2) “[T]o foster a fundamental respect for 
individual development and self-realization.”153  This individual realization 
must be free from government restraint regardless of the nature or 
manner of the views, “unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary.”154 
Inconsistent tests balancing the Lanham Act and First Amendment 
rights, and inconsistent application of those tests, result in defeating the 
purposes of the First Amendment.  The uninhibited marketplace of ideas 
and potential for individual expression are greatly restricted by the 
prospective effects of inconsistent litigation.155  Artists are unlikely to 
 
 150. Id. at 998. 
 151. 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998). 
 152. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734–35. 
 153. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001) 
(quoting in part Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 1979)), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002).  Guglielmi based its reasoning on Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969), and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).  Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 458 (discussing free speech rights as 
“essential in a democratic system of government”). 
 154. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 803 (quoting Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 458). 
 155. See Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 803 (discussing the potential for the 
right of publicity to limit important elements of speech); see also Michael Madow, 
Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. 
REV. 125 (1993).  Madow discusses the importance of speech about celebrities: 
[I]ndividuals and groups also use star signs in their everyday lives to 
communicate meanings of their own making.  They make active and creative 
use of celebrity images to construct themselves and their social relations, to 
identify themselves as individuals and as members of subcultural groups, and 
to express and communicate their sense of themselves and their particular 
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use celebrity names in their work for fear of litigation.  Celebrities are an 
integral part of American culture, whether they are heroes, rock stars, or 
just the next big thing.156  Courts recognize First Amendment protection 
for popular culture commentary irrespective of the content of the ideas 
expressed.  A free marketplace of ideas requires clear restrictions on 
celebrity name usage.  The Lanham Act’s limitations on expression are 
valid so long as the uncertainty surrounding its application does not push 
that protection beyond its legal limits. 
V.  BALANCING PROBLEMS 
A.  Tests Balancing Section 43(a) and the First Amendment 
1.  Likelihood of Confusion 
In typical trademark cases, courts apply the likelihood of confusion 
test to determine infringement.157  The primary question under this test is 
 
experience of the world.  Indeed, celebrity images are among the basic 
semiotic and symbolic raw materials out of which individuals and groups 
“establish their presence, identity and meaning.” 
Id. at 143 (citing PAUL WILLIS ET AL., COMMON CULTURE: SYMBOLIC WORK AT PLAY IN 
THE EVERYDAY CULTURES OF THE YOUNG 1 (1990)). 
 156. “Celebrities . . . are an important element of the shared communicative resources of 
our cultural domain.”  Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
972 (10th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 335 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2003); see ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, 
Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 933 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Cardtoons to recognize the First 
Amendment importance of artist’s ability to create and sell prints of a Tiger Woods painting); 
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 n.6 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Trademarks are often reflected in the mirror of 
our popular culture.”); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9, LaFace Records v. Parks, 
124 S. Ct. 925 (2003) (No. 03-504), available at 2003 WL 23145528. 
 157. See Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 
648 (6th Cir. 1982) (adopting likelihood of confusion test from AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft 
Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979)), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1988); see also 
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447–48 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining application 
of the test), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003). 
The Ninth Circuit restated the likelihood of confusion factors as they apply to celebrity 
cases.  As restated by the court, these factors are: 
1.  [T]he level of recognition that the plaintiff has among the segment of the 
  society for whom the defendant’s product is intended; 
2.  the relatedness of the fame or success of the plaintiff to the defendant’s  
  product; 
3.  the similarity of the likeness used by the defendant to the actual plaintiff; 
4.  evidence of actual confusion; 
5.  marketing channels used; 
6.  likely degree of purchaser care; 
7.  defendant’s intent on selecting the plaintiff; and 
8.  likelihood of expansion of the product lines. 
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1002, 1007–09 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding 
genuine issue of material fact as to surfers’ endorsement of clothing catalog when 
catalog used surfers’ names and images without their consent “essentially as window-
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whether consumers would likely be confused as to the product’s 
source.158  The likelihood of confusion factors vary by jurisdiction, but 
usually include: strength of the plaintiff’s mark,159 relatedness of the 
goods,160 similarity of the marks,161 evidence of actual confusion,162 
 
dressing to advance the catalog’s surf-theme”).  The overtly commercial nature of the 
defendant’s speech distinguishes it from cases of hybrid artistic and commercial 
expression discussed in this Comment.  See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 F. 
Supp. 2d 1055, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 158. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000) (premising liability on use in commerce 
“likely to cause confusion”). 
 159. Strength of plaintiff’s mark is a two-part analysis, weighing the mark’s 
inherent distinctiveness and the degree of distinctiveness in the marketplace.  Nabisco v. 
Warner-Lambert Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 690, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing W.W.W. Pharm. 
Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 572 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lang v. Ret. Living Publ’g 
Co., 949 F.2d 576, 581 (2d Cir. 1991)), aff’d, 220 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000)).  Inherent 
distinctiveness is determined through classifying the mark as generic, descriptive, 
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful.  Distinctiveness in the marketplace is determined by 
many factors, including “evidence of money spent on product (i.e., advertising and 
marketing expenditures), success in the marketplace (i.e., sales and consumer studies), 
recognition by others in the market (i.e., awards or prizes), and length and exclusivity of 
use (i.e., attempts to plagiarize).”  Nabisco, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 697–98. 
 160. The more closely related the goods are, the more likely consumers are to be 
confused as to their source.  Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1147 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
 161. Similarity of the marks is particularly important in cases between direct 
competitors.  See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 
F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 
F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing rule).  Courts analyze similarities in spelling, 
appearance, and pronunciation.  Id. 
 162. See Edwin S. Clark, Comment, Finding Likelihood of Confusion with Actual 
Confusion: A Critical Analysis of the Federal Courts’ Approach, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 393 (1992) (arguing that federal courts give more weight to actual confusion than 
other factors, that objections to this application are baseless, and that this shift should be 
explicitly recognized).  Actual confusion is “undoubtedly the best evidence” of 
likelihood of confusion.  Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 601 (6th 
Cir. 1991).  However, because evidence of actual confusion is “difficult to produce and 
frequently discounted as unclear or insubstantial,” it should be “weighted heavily only 
when there is evidence of past confusion, or perhaps, when the particular circumstances 
indicate such evidence should have been available.”  Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 
1183, 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting in part Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 
750 F.2d 903, 914 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 352–53)); see also 
Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1119 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (stating rule); Times Newspapers, Ltd. v. Times Publ’g Co., No. 92-1435-
CIV-T-15(A), 1993 WL 120614, at *5 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (stating rule). 
Clark traces this rule’s basis to Judge Frank’s dissent in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. 
Rohrlich, where Judge Frank noted that finding no likelihood of confusion must yield to 
a finding of actual confusion.  Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 976 (2d 
Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting).  Thus, finding actual confusion would automatically 
result in a finding of likelihood of confusion.  Clark, supra, at 399–400. 
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marketing channels used, likely degree of purchaser care, the defendant’s 
intent in selecting the mark, and likelihood of expansion of the product 
lines of the parties.163  These factors are used only as a guide.  They are 
not intended to be used as a “scorecard—whether a party ‘wins’ a 
majority of the factors is not the point.”164  At the summary judgment 
stage, the court then decides whether a genuine issue of material fact as 
to the likelihood of confusion exists.165 
Some courts apply the traditional likelihood of confusion test to 
celebrity infringement cases without any special First Amendment 
considerations.  Courts consider the “mark” to be the celebrity’s persona.166  
The strength of the mark refers to the level of recognition the celebrity 
receives in society.167  The “goods” are the reasons for, or sources of, the 
plaintiff’s fame.168 
This test is consistent with traditional product infringement trademark 
cases.  It does not attempt to apply a special judge-made standard to the 
special case of celebrities; rather, it simply treats the celebrity’s right as 
the same as any other trademarked good.169  Some courts criticize this 
effect170 even though the test “generally strikes a comfortable balance 
between the trademark owner’s property rights and the public’s expressive 
interests.”171  The test is also “intuitive, straightforward, and easy to 
apply.”172  Professor Lee states that courts applying this test simply find 
confusing speech to be misleading.  Since the First Amendment does not 
protect misleading speech, speech causing consumer confusion is not 
protected.173 
 
 163. If either party might expand to compete with the other, the potential for 
likelihood of confusion is greater.  Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 
F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354 
(9th Cir. 1979)), aff’d, 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 164. Thane Int’l, 305 F.3d at 901. 
 165. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining the 
test, but ultimately declining to apply it), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003). 
 166. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(citing Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
 167. White, 971 F.2d at 1400 (citing Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. 
Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 168. White, 971 F.2d at 1400. 
 169. Parks, 329 F.3d at 449; cf. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1002, 1007–08 (adapting 
traditional test to use of pictures of “surfing legends” in catalog). 
 170. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 449 (noting that simply applying the traditional 
likelihood of confusion test is inadequate because it ignores the communicative value of 
artistic work, and that titles can be “part and parcel” of the artistic work). 
 171. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003). The court goes on to say that when the trademark owner 
in a products context attempts to limit how people can express themselves, the likelihood 
of confusion test does not adequately weigh First Amendment interests.  Id. 
 172. Lee, supra note 6, at 486–87. 
 173. Id. 
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The most significant problem in applying the likelihood of confusion 
test to celebrity cases is that it does not specifically address the First 
Amendment defense.174  Arguably, Congress weighed the First Amendment 
claim when it enacted the Act.175  When the Act was passed, it applied 
solely to commercial advertising contexts.176  Congress probably did not 
anticipate the current expansion covering celebrities’ rights concerning 
speech that is not purely commercial.177  Even in a commercial advertising 
context, celebrities historically lost cases factually similar to those that 
they have recently won.178  Adequate recognition of artists’ First 
Amendment freedom of speech is necessary to protect artists’ ability to 
freely create while ensuring that clear boundaries exist. 
2.  Alternative Avenues 
The second test used by some courts to balance section 43(a) and the 
First Amendment is the alternative avenues test.  Under this test, an 
expressive work’s use of a trademark has First Amendment protection 
only if no sufficient alternative means exist to express the idea conveyed 
 
 174. Parks, 329 F.3d at 448–49. 
 175. Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 
1078 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (discussing Dr. Seuss and the likelihood that the Ninth Circuit 
would not adopt Rogers because First Amendment concerns had already been weighed 
by the legislature). 
 176. Discussing the Lanham Act’s purpose, the Second Circuit stated: 
Congress’ purpose in enacting § 43(a) was to create a special and limited 
unfair competition remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of 
consumers generally and almost certainly without any consideration of 
consumer rights of action in particular.  The Act’s purpose . . . is exclusively to 
protect the interests of a purely commercial class against unscrupulous 
commercial conduct. 
Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 177. Lemley, supra note 15, at 1713 (“[N]o one in 1948 could seriously have 
thought the law would contemplate granting [this type of protection.]”).  Lemley 
advocates taking “the likelihood of confusion requirement, the fair use doctrine, and the 
doctrine of non-trademark use seriously,” in order to eradicate “the property rationale for 
trademarks.”  Id. at 1714.  Courts should be concerned with expanding trademark rights 
beyond the scope envisioned by the Lanham Act’s drafters when such expansion has 
serious First Amendment implications. 
 178. Compare Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 348–49 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding no cause of action for celebrity against advertiser for using 
imitation of her voice in a commercial because her voice cannot be trademarked), with 
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108–11 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding for singer 
under similar facts), amended by 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 27031 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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by using the trademark.179  This test classifies trademarks as a property 
interest.  Its owner need not “yield to the exercise of First Amendment 
rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of 
communication exist.”180  The Eighth Circuit has used the alternative 
avenues test in the contexts of a product logo parody and a film title 
containing another company’s registered trademark.181 
This test originated in the Second Circuit’s 1979 decision in Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.182  In Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, the defendant’s “gross and revolting sex film” entitled 
“Debbie Does Dallas” used the distinctive Dallas Cowboys cheerleader 
costume without permission.183  The court examined whether the filmmaker 
could express his message of “sexuality in athletics” without using the 
uniform’s distinctive design.184  The court found that the filmmaker’s 
message could be expressed in “numerous ways . . . without infringing 
plaintiff’s trademark,” and upheld the plaintiff’s claim.185 
The Eighth Circuit adopted the alternative avenues test in Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak.186  In Novak, the defendant created t-shirts, 
coffee mugs, and other merchandise containing a picture depicting an 
emaciated, bonneted human head resembling the Mutual of Omaha’s 
logo.187  The shirts contained the words “Mutant of Omaha” and “Nuclear 
Holocaust Insurance.”188  The defendant claimed his merchandise parodied 
the logo.189  The court determined that alternative methods of expressing 
the same idea existed, and therefore the artist’s use of Mutual of 
Omaha’s logo infringed its trademark.190 
In American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Productions, the Eighth 
 
 179. Parks, 329 F.3d at 448 (citing Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 
402 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
 180. Novak, 836 F.2d at 402 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 
(1972)). 
 181. Id. at 398, 402. 
 182. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 183. Id. at 202–03. 
 184. Id. at 206.  The court clearly did not take the defendant’s message very 
seriously.  As described by the court, the film’s plot: 
[T]o the extent that there is one, involves a cheerleader at a fictional high 
school, Debbie, who has been selected to become a “Texas Cowgirl.”  In order 
to raise enough money to send Debbie, and eventually the entire squad, to 
Dallas, the cheerleaders perform sexual services for a fee.  The movie consists 
largely of a series of scenes graphically depicting the sexual escapades of the 
“actors.” 
Id. at 202–03. 
 185. Id. at 206. 
 186. 836 F.2d at 402. 
 187. Id. at 398. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 401. 
 190. Id. at 402. 
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Circuit considered whether a movie studio’s use of a trademarked 
corporate name in a movie title infringed the trademarked name.191  The 
court acknowledged Rogers but reverted to the alternative avenues test 
because it found the title to be commercial speech.192  Because the film 
title “Dairy Queens” had nothing to do with American Dairy Queen’s 
trademark or products, the court found that other titles would be 
adequate for the film.193  American Dairy Queen seems to be a significant 
departure from applying Rogers.  If the court applied Rogers and no 
artistic relevance whatsoever was found, then the Lanham Act would 
apply notwithstanding First Amendment concerns.  Instead, American 
Dairy Queen classified the title as commercial speech.  It found that 
alternative avenues existed to express New Line’s idea, such as “Dairy 
Princesses” or “Milk Maids.”194 
The Eighth Circuit has not yet applied this test to a celebrity name 
infringement case.  The Second Circuit refused to extend this application 
to a celebrity name confusion case in Rogers, and instead established a 
third test.195 
The alternative avenues test provides celebrities with the greatest 
protection of the various tests used by the Courts of Appeals.196  Proof of 
infringement still requires showing likelihood of confusion.  The First 
Amendment defense is disposed of when the plaintiff can show that the 
 
 191. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734–35 
(D. Minn. 1998). 
 192. Id. at 734. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.  The court did not apply Central Hudson because the alternative avenues 
test is designed to take into account First Amendment issues.  Id. at 735.  The court 
simply noted that Central Hudson stands for lesser protection for commercial speech.  
Id.  New Line did not appeal this decision.  This case stands as the Eighth Circuit’s only 
application of the alternative avenues test to a mass entertainment product. 
 195. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1989).  Rogers states that 
Dallas Cowboys involved “blatantly false advertising” and holds the case out as a special 
situation.  Id. at 999 n.4.  Because the Second Circuit now applies Rogers to cover all 
works of artistic expression, and given the Rogers opinion’s harsh characterization of the 
alternative avenues test, it is unlikely that the Second Circuit would now employ the 
alternative avenues test.  See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003); 5 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 
31:144, at 31-235 to 31-237 (discussing Rogers’s concern with alternative avenues test’s 
inability to properly balance First Amendment and Lanham Act concerns, and Rogers’s 
adoption in different contexts in other circuits). 
 196. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (stating that the alternative avenues test 
insufficiently accommodates the public’s interest in free expression). 
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defendant had alternative ways to express his idea.197  Finding sufficient 
alternative means to express an idea goes directly to the court’s 
perception of the use’s artistic integrity.198  If the court feels that the 
artist’s use of a celebrity’s name or image makes a unique artistic 
statement, it is unlikely that it will find a sufficient alternative method to 
express that idea. 
This interpretation broadens the Lanham Act’s applicability.  By 
protecting the individuals’ rights so long as alternate means of 
communicating the idea exist, the artist must exclude every existing 
celebrity name and image unless he can prove that the idea’s expression 
with the celebrity name is the best expression—that is, that no sufficient 
alternative means of expression exist.  Thus, the alternative avenues test 
recognizes and rewards the effort of celebrities in creating and 
maintaining their name, public image, and the associations that the 
public draws from them.  In doing so, it severely limits artists’ abilities 
to freely create work involving those celebrities.199 
The alternative avenues test is exceptionally subjective.  The court 
must judge both whether the use is artistically relevant and whether that 
relevance can be approximated by another similar alternative.200  Judges 
 
 197. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 
206 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 198. Parks, 329 F.3d at 450 (discussing the difficulties in substituting words for 
those of the author in attempting to convey the same message, and suggesting that the 
alternative avenues test would “needlessly entangle courts in the process of titling works 
of art”). 
 199. Novak involved a parody of a famous trademark.  See supra notes 186–90 and 
accompanying text.  Describing musical parody in a copyright infringement case, Justice 
Kennedy stated: “The parody must target the original, and not just its general style, the 
genre of art to which it belongs, or society as a whole (although if it targets the original, 
it may target those features as well).”  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 597 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 
(2d Cir. 1992); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986)).  In typical trademark 
cases, parody is not really a separate defense to infringement, but merely another way of 
saying that consumers are not likely to be confused as to the product’s source.  Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., No. CV 97-6791-WMB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *29 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 1998) (citing Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 
109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997)), aff’d, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1171 (2003).  Recognizing that the “Mutant of Omaha” design parodied the 
insurance company’s logo, the court nonetheless denied First Amendment protection 
because the plaintiffs showed significant evidence of actual confusion, thus presenting a 
strong infringement case.  Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400–01 (8th 
Cir. 1997). 
 200. The Sixth Circuit in Parks aptly criticized this test as follows: “[A]dopting the 
‘alternative avenues’ test would needlessly entangle courts in the process of titling works 
of art; courts would be asked to determine not just whether a title is reasonably ‘artistic’ 
but whether a title is ‘necessary’ to communicate the idea.”  Parks, 329 F.3d at 450.  
Notably, however, taking such pains as lyrical translation and comparing a “message” to 
a celebrity’s artistic qualities seem to move toward a similar “needless[] entangle[ment]” 
that the court was so conscious to avoid.  Id. 
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often warn their colleagues against interpreting artistic work at all; thus, 
it makes sense that if courts need to make some interpretation, it should 
be at the simplest, most-baseline level possible.  The alternative avenues 
test goes far beyond this surface look, “needlessly entang[ling] courts in 
the process of titling works of art.”201  In moving away from using this 
test, Rogers quoted Cohen v. California: “[W]e cannot indulge the facile 
assumption that one can forbid particular words without running a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”202  Courts should 
not be put in the position of evaluating artistic work and then suggesting 
and evaluating alternatives based on their subjective evaluation. 
3.  Rogers Balancing Test 
a.  Application to Using Celebrity Names 
The Rogers balancing test attempts to accommodate the dual public 
interests: free expression and avoiding consumer confusion.203  Under 
Rogers, the Lanham Act does not apply to the use of a celebrity’s name 
in a title “unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work 
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly 
misleads as to the source or the content of the work.”204  The court made 
clear that minimal artistic relevance is an “appropriately low threshold.”205  
To exemplify this threshold, the court discussed both a song and a movie 
that contained celebrity names in their titles.206  While neither title made 
any overt indication of the celebrity’s involvement or endorsement of the 
work, each had the requisite minimal artistic relevance because the 
content of each had something to do with their titles.207  The court found 
that “the slight risk that such use of a celebrity’s name might implicitly 
suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some people is outweighed by 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)). 
 203. Id. at 998. 
 204. Id. at 999. 
 205. Id.  The court made clear that its test would construe the Lanham Act 
narrowly.  Id. at 998. 
 206. “Bette Davis Eyes” and “Come Back to the Five and Dime, Jimmy Dean, 
Jimmy Dean”, respectively.  Id. at 999–1000. 
 207. The court notes that each of these titles might contain requisite artistic 
relevance, but that the final decision is for the factfinder.  Its conclusion was only that, in 
such an instance, the factfinder should have the opportunity to determine if such minimal 
relevance exists.  Id. at 1000 n.6. 
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the danger of restricting artistic expression, and the Lanham Act is not 
applicable.”208 
Once any artistic relevance whatsoever is found, the title is not subject 
to the Lanham Act unless it is explicitly misleading as to the source or 
content of the work.209  The court demonstrated that specific titles can 
indicate the source from which the work originated, “such as ‘Nimmer 
on Copyright’ [or] ‘Jane Fonda’s Workout Book.’”210  If the work did 
not originate with the individual named in the title, it would be explicitly 
misleading and the Lanham Act would apply.  This prong of the Rogers 
test protects the consumer from potentially misleading explicit 
information as to the work’s source notwithstanding artistic relevance. 
b.  Application to Using Celebrity Images 
Properly applied, the Rogers test can similarly protect celebrity 
images.  For example, in Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, civil rights activist 
and former Black Panther Bobby Seale made a Lanham Act claim 
against the producers of the film, “Panther.”211  His suit challenged the 
use of his name and likeness (in the form of an actor portraying him) in 
the film, on the cover of a book memorializing the film, the soundtrack 
CD, and the home video.212  The film recounted the history of the Black 
Panther party in a “docudrama” format presenting a dramatic recreation 
or adaptation of actual events and thus was not a true historical account 
per se.213  The court considered the use of Seale’s image and name in the 
film and on the covers of both the book and CD as artistically relevant to 
the content of each expression. 
Seale is best known for his participation in the Black Panther movement.  
Because each of these media recounted that involvement, use of his 
name was artistically relevant in that it related to the content of each 
media.214  Relevance existed because of the nexus between the actions 
for which Seale is known and reference to those actions (even if in a 
fictional light) in the film and book.   
The Rogers test is closer to traditional trademark law because 
likelihood of confusion is a key interest.  Unlike traditional tests, it 
considers First Amendment rights explicitly.  Adoption of Rogers by the 
 
 208. Id at 1000. 
 209. Id. at 999. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 332–33 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d 
without opinion, 156 F.3d 1225 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 212. Id. at 334–35. 
 213. Id. at 335 (citing 2 MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 28, § 
8.9[A] n.2 (1999)). 
 214. Id. at 340. 
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Ninth Circuit in 2002 and the Sixth Circuit in 2003 demonstrates this 
test’s growing acceptance.215 
B.  Problems Applying Rogers 
1.  Relevant as to What? 
The District Court and Court of Appeals opinions in Parks demonstrate 
problems interpreting Rogers without a clear federal standard.  In the 
District Court case, the court considered the question of minimal artistic 
relevance in a different light than did the Court of Appeals.216  The 
District Court analyzed the song on its face by considering its lyrics.  
The song’s chorus is: “ah hah, hush that fuss, everybody move to the 
back of the bus.”217  The court found that the song made “unmistakable 
reference” to the act for which Rosa Parks is universally known.218  Ms. 
Parks protested segregation laws in Montgomery, Alabama in 1955 by 
refusing to move to the back of a bus.219  Based solely on this link 
between the chorus of OutKast’s song and Ms. Parks’s historic actions, 
the court found the relation between using her name in the title of the 
song and its content to be “so obvious that the matter is not open to 
reasonable debate.”220  How, then, did the Court of Appeals overturn this 
obvious connection? 
The Court of Appeals framed the question differently.  Instead of 
attempting to find a connection between the use of the name “Rosa 
Parks” and content of OutKast’s song, the Court of Appeals looked to 
link the content of the song with Parks’s personal qualities.221  This 
 
 215. The Ninth Circuit expressly adopted Rogers in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 
Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003).  The Sixth 
Circuit Parks decision likewise expressly adopted Rogers, although as discussed infra 
notes 216–24 and the accompanying text, the court went too far in analyzing the content 
of the song at issue.  Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451–52 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining, after analyzing each of the tests, the court’s determination that the 
“application of Rogers in Mattel, as well as in cases decided in other circuits, persuades 
us that Rogers is the best test for balancing Defendants’ and the public’s interest in free 
expression under the First Amendment . . . and the public’s interest in enforcement of the 
Lanham Act”), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003). 
 216. Parks v. LaFace Records, 76 F. Supp. 2d 775, 780–84 (E.D. Mich. 1999), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003). 
 217. The chorus is repeated a total of ten times.  Id. at 780. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Parks, 329 F.3d at 442. 
 220. Parks, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 782. 
 221. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9–11, Parks v. LaFace Records, 124 S. Ct. 
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important distinction strayed from the Rogers analysis.  Under the Court 
of Appeals’ interpretation of Rogers, the song would have to have been 
about Parks herself and not simply demonstrate some minimal artistic 
relevance of the title to the content of the song.  The court said as much 
when it went to great lengths to “translate” the lyrics of the song to 
determine whether the song was about Parks.222  After this translation it 
was easy to find a question of fact as to whether artistic relevance 
existed.  As the basis of the Court of Appeals’ analysis, the translation 
removed the obvious link to Parks by rephrasing the reference to her 
universally known act of moving to the back of the bus.  Instead of 
recognizing this link to Parks, the court translated it out of the analysis 
and found that the title of “Rosa Parks” had no artistic relevance 
whatsoever to the content of the song.  After admonishing the song’s 
profanity, the court stated that the lyrics “contain absolutely nothing that 
could conceivably, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered, 
explicitly or implicitly, a reference to courage, to sacrifice, to the civil 
rights movement or to any other quality with which Rosa Parks is 
identified.”223  True.  By rephrasing the key Rogers question from “Does 
the title have any minimal artistic relevance whatsoever to the content of 
the work?” to “Does the content of the work have any minimal 
connection to the personality traits or qualities of the celebrity named in 
the title?”, the Court of Appeals drastically changed the Rogers 
inquiry.224  Instead of attempting to link something from the expression 
to anything recognizable about the celebrity, the Court of Appeals 
attempted to link something from the expression to some quality or 
attribute of the celebrity.  Thus, a link to an event in the celebrity’s life 
would not suffice under this version of the Rogers analysis. 
A similar type of analysis may have yielded a different result in 
Rogers.  In Rogers, the court was satisfied to find that the presence of 
characters nicknamed Ginger and Fred in the film passed the minimal 
artistic relevance threshold.  Suppose that, instead, the court wanted to 
determine whether the characters Ginger and Fred had similar qualities 
 
925 (2003) (No. 03-504), available at 2003 WL 23145528. 
 222. The Court of Appeals resorted to a “translation” of the song, derived by Parks 
from “‘dictionaries’ of the ‘rap’ vernacular.”  The chorus of, “Ah hah, hush that fuss/ 
Everybody move to the back of the bus/ Do you wanna bump and slump with us/ We the 
type of people make the club get crunk” was translated to, “Be quiet and stop the 
commotion. OutKast is coming back out [with new music] so all other MCs [mic 
checkers, rappers, Master of Ceremonies] step aside.  Do you want to ride and hang out 
with us?  OutKast is the type of group to make the clubs get hyped-up/excited.”  Parks, 
329 F.3d at 442–43, 452. 
 223. Id. at 453 (emphasis added). 
 224. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10–12, Parks, (No. 03-504) (discussing 
Sixth Circuit’s transformation of the Rogers inquiry). 
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to Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.  The court could have solicited 
testimony of dance experts to determine whether the characters provided 
an accurate portrayal of Rogers’s and Astaire’s dance moves.  It could 
have questioned the pair’s friends to determine whether the characters’ 
personality traits accurately reflected individuals’ qualities.  Of course, 
Rogers rejected this type of analysis out of hand.225  Rather, the court 
explicitly required only minimal relevance to the content of the film, not 
an accurate portrayal of the celebrity involved.  The Court of Appeals 
decision in Parks suggests the second, faulty analysis. 
2.  Considering Artists’ Notoriety 
The second problem courts face when applying Rogers is discerning 
whether the artist used the celebrity to gain notoriety for himself.  To do 
this, courts are tempted to consider an artist’s commercial popularity 
when applying Rogers. If an artist is popular, he will have less reason to 
use a celebrity’s name or likeness for his own gain, and thus the use is 
more likely artistic in nature.  Likewise, an unknown artist using a 
celebrity’s name will do so to gain notoriety for his work, free-riding on 
the celebrity’s fame. 
This is the type of unfair competition that the Lanham Act intended to 
avoid, but considering an artist’s current popularity as indicia of unfair 
competition is improper.  The analysis must be limited to the work’s 
content in order to treat all artists equally.  Rogers does not question 
anything outside the use of the name inside the work itself.  If the use 
does not lack any artistic relevance whatsoever, it is irrelevant whether 
the artist was nominated for a Grammy for the song (as OutKast was for 
Rosa Parks) or the song never received a minute of radio airplay.226  
Whether an artist has already gained notoriety should have no bearing on 
the First Amendment protection he receives. 
OutKast had achieved critical success before the “Rosa Parks” release.  
The Sixth Circuit scrutinized OutKast’s use of Parks’s name in light of 
whether it increased album sales as a part of its artistic relevance 
inquiry.  The court found that it “unquestionably” increased sales, and 
 
 225. The Rogers court rejected Ginger Rogers’s claim that the title was misleading 
because the film was not about her.  Instead, it found the title to be entirely truthful as to 
the content of the film in referring to the film’s characters and story.  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 
875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 226. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Parks (No. 03-504). 
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viewed this benefit as the true reason for OutKast’s use.227  The court’s 
logic fails on two grounds.  First, the court failed to acknowledge that 
OutKast may have sold just as many records because the group had 
“received widespread critical acclaim within the music industry and 
from the general public.”228  Second, and more importantly, the court 
should not look beyond the name’s relevance to the song to determine 
infringement.  Doing so would suggest a rule that provides greater First 
Amendment protection for well known artists.  Such a rule would stifle 
creativity: a presumption that an unknown artist’s use is improper 
because its true purpose is to gain notoriety systematically discriminates 
against new or unknown artists.  At best, it permits only the speech of 
commercially successful bands such as OutKast (or commercially viable 
bands such as Aqua, at issue in Mattel), because these groups have the 
resources to litigate their claims.  At the same time, it counts as a strike 
against any unsigned band in a similar situation, but lacking the funds to 
litigate.  However, as OutKast’s defeat in Parks demonstrates, simply 
having resources to litigate will not help an artist if courts continue to 
apply inconsistent tests to their speech. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to assess artistic relevance without considering 
whether a use is an advertising ploy.  Artists’ intentions in using a 
trademark are difficult to ascertain.  Artists cannot simply “cry symbol” 
to avoid liability.229  At the same time, courts’ unbiased ability to find a 
link between a work and its title, according to Rogers’s “appropriately 
low threshold,” is not so daunting a task to be unmanageable.230  
Isolating the analysis to the work at hand, without considering the 
artists’ success (or lack thereof), is the only way to fairly analyze artists 
on a level scale and provide the same protection for each artist’s speech. 
Properly, Mattel left Aqua’s lack of notoriety out of the equation.  
Aqua did not have any commercial success in the United States prior to 
“Barbie Girl.”231  Indeed, “Barbie Girl” may have been a major record 
label’s ploy to gain international commercial success for a group that 
could sell records, but was short on talent.  Even so, Judge Kozinski did 
not analyze Aqua’s lack of prior record sales when applying Rogers, nor 
did he venture a guess as to how many more records Aqua sold because 
 
 227. Parks, 329 F.3d at 453–54. 
 228. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Parks (No. 03-504) (citing numerous 
newspaper articles praising OutKast’s social consciousness and musical talent). 
 229. Parks, 329 F.3d at 454. 
 230. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
 231. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003).  The band had some success in their native Denmark with 
one platinum record and a single reaching gold record status faster than any other in 
Danish history.  Jeremy Ulrey, Aqua: Biography, at http://ubl.artistdirect.com/music/ 
artist/bio/0,,593419,00.html?artist=Aqua (last visited Nov. 26, 2004). 
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the song was not entitled “Little Plastic Blond Doll” (or any other non-
trademarked alternative).  Unlike Parks, where the judge suggested another 
song title for “Rosa Parks” (although he disclaimed applying the 
alternative avenues test), Mattel properly focused solely on the song’s 
content to find relevance. 
V.  SOLUTION 
A.  Proper Formulation/Application of Rogers 
Properly applied, the Rogers test is an appropriate balance of whether 
the use of a name is protected by the First Amendment.  Standing alone, 
the likelihood of confusion test is inadequate to balance trademark and 
First Amendment interests.232  If the Lanham Act applies under Rogers, 
the traditional likelihood of confusion test should be applied to 
determine whether the use infringes the plaintiff’s mark notwithstanding 
First Amendment concerns.233  Once the court specifically addresses and 
accommodates First Amendment concerns, likelihood of consumer 
confusion is the appropriate test.  At this point, the case becomes a standard 
trademark infringement claim and the statutory test for infringement 
must be applied.234   
Inconsistent application of Rogers has created numerous, confused 
standards under the guise of a Rogers analysis.  Courts should be concerned 
with maintaining trademark law’s traditional purpose of avoiding 
consumer confusion and avoiding further muddling of a legal regime 
intended to protect consumers.  Likewise, courts should protect artists 
from celebrities intending to use trademark as a sword to capitalize on 
 
 232. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900 (noting that the likelihood of confusion test is 
inadequate when a trademark owner tries to control expression). 
 233. See id. at 17. 
 234. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16, Parks (No. 03-504) (criticizing Sixth 
Circuit’s statement that if a jury found no artistic relevance in OutKast’s use of Parks’s 
name in “Rosa Parks,” it would violate the Lanham Act without consideration of 
likelihood of confusion or other ordinary trademark infringement claim prerequisites).  A 
celebrity Lanham Act claim does not create a new, different cause of action under the 
current Act.  The Parks court misinterpreted Rogers to mean that finding “no artistic 
relevance whatsoever” replaces traditional trademark concerns.  See id.  Rogers did not 
intend this result; it merely used artistic relevance test to determine whether the Act 
applied at all.  If it did, then the court gave no indication that it would not still consider 
the likelihood of consumer confusion or other traditional trademark concerns.  The Parks 
court’s interpretation essentially changes the requirements for proving a claim.  In doing 
so, the court creates a kind of “mutant defamation law, wholly unmoored by the 
Trademark Act’s commercial focus.”  Id. 
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their power and fame.  Applying the Rogers balancing test and holding 
to the “minimal threshold” of artistic relevance that it requires permits 
courts to accommodate both interests.  When courts have to look beyond 
the surface of the work to ask whether a use is artistically relevant, it 
should already have decided that this minimal standard has been met. 
Rogers is the best test to accommodate First Amendment and Lanham 
Act interests.  It specifically addresses the First Amendment issues.  It 
provides a minimal threshold of artistic relevance for artists to use celebrity 
names, celebrity images and culturally significant symbols necessary to 
express their ideas without fear of litigation.235  Under Rogers, courts do 
not have to make the bold artistic judgments required of the alternative 
avenues test—much less than being required to actually suggest 
alternatives for artists to use in their work.  Critics of Rogers note that 
courts are ill equipped to make judgments to determine whether using a 
celebrity’s name in a title has some artistic relevance to the content or if 
the name is used simply to exploit its commercial value.236  Properly 
applied, Rogers does not require dissections of artistic work.  A court 
must make artistic value judgments, but only sufficient to find a minimal 
standard of relevancy to the content of the work.  In fact, and much to 
the chagrin of many celebrities, a minimally artistic use can be a “good 
marketing tool,” designed just to sell more copies.237 
 
 235. Some commentators have argued that a federal right of publicity will solve the 
problem.  See generally Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a 
Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 227 
(1999); J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a 
Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1987); Jennifer Y. Choi, Comment, No Room 
for Cheers: Schizophrenic Application in the Realm of Right of Publicity Protection, 9 
VILL. SPORTS. & ENT. L.J. 121, 150 (2002); Felix H. Kent, Advertising Law—Reviewing 
1997: Tobacco Settlement, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 19, 1997, at 3.  This may be the case.  My 
point is that, whatever new federal legal regime is created to deal with these types of 
claims, trademark is not the appropriate regime to use.  See also K.J. Greene, Abusive 
Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine—Trademark 
Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 609, 612–14 (2004) (discussing the use of trademark law by celebrities and 
corporations to limit speech with which they do not agree, and the resultant circumvention of 
the policies underlying trademark).  By applying Rogers as the minimum threshold that it 
was intended to be, the Lanham Act will not apply in most of these cases. 
 236. 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 29, § 27:86, at 27-171 to 27-172. 
 237. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 453 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 
S. Ct. 925 (2003); see Parks v. LaFace Records, 76 F. Supp. 2d 775, 781 (E.D. Mich. 
1999) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendants only used her name to sell records, 
and stating that “grave harm” would result if courts were required to compel the author 
to justify use of the celebrity’s identity), rev’d, 329 F.3d at 437, cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
at 925. 
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B.  Application to Other Entertainment Industry Issues 
1.  Soundtracks 
Soundtracks present a difficult situation.  In Seale, the court distinguished 
between use of Bobby Seale’s name in the film “Panther”, on packaging 
for the film and on a book about the film from use of his name on 
packaging for the film’s soundtrack compact disc.  The songs on the CD 
were “merely a collection of different songs performed by different 
musicians . . . .”238  Each song on the CD played during the film.239  The 
court differentiated the songs’ connection to the film from their lack of 
connection to Seale or the history of the Black Panther Party.240  Here, 
the question of minimal artistic relevance required an intermediate step 
from the celebrity, through the film, to the music in the film. 
The court seems to draw this artificial distinction as a way to limit 
Rogers’s application.  Seale’s name had artistic relevance to the film.  The 
music had artistic relevance to the film.  The soundtrack was not a random 
assortment of songs from unrelated artists; rather, it was a carefully 
planned and produced collection relating directly to the artistic presentation 
of “Panther.”  The songs certainly were not about Seale.  However, when 
presented with the story of the film, they were artistically related to his 
character (if not Seale in the historical sense).  When packaged as the 
soundtrack to that film, the connection is clear to the consumer that the 
name “Bobby Seale” on its cover is in connection to Seale in the film, 
not as an endorsement by Seale through an actor portraying him on a CD 
cover.  Whether consumers might mistakenly believe that Seale endorsed the 
film is a risk that the First Amendment allows.241  When a soundtrack consists 
of songs played during a film, its packaging should be able to name 
characters from that film because of the connection between the two. 
 
 238. Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 239. Id. at 335. 
 240. Id. at 337: 
Clearly, the use of the Plaintiff’s name and likeness on the cover of the musical 
CD/cassette does not relate to the content in the CD/cassette in the same 
manner as the use of the Plaintiff’s name and likeness on the cover of the home 
video and pictorial history book relates to the content of the film and pictorial 
history book—the subject matter of which concerns the Black Panther Party 
and the Plaintiff’s role as co-founder of the Party. 
 241. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he slight risk that 
such use of a celebrity’s name might implicitly suggest endorsement or sponsorship to 
some people is outweighed by the danger of restricting artistic expression, and the 
Lanham Act is not applicable.”). 




2.  Cover Art/Track Listing 
Compact discs and movies invariably include some sort of packaging.  
In the case of a compact disc, the packaging usually includes cover 
artwork and a track listing.  In the case of a DVD or VHS tape, the 
packaging generally includes a picture related to the film as well as a 
summary of the plot.  If a celebrity’s name is included on the packaging, 
how does the Lanham Act apply? 
Under Rogers, the use would be protected if it had any artistic 
relevance whatsoever to the content of the packaging.  That is, a song 
title with a celebrity’s name in it may only be used on the packaging for 
a CD containing that song.242  In the case of a film, a name could only be 
used if it was artistically relevant to the film itself.  Either situation 
contains some gray areas.  For example, what if a trumpet player touted 
himself as the next Miles Davis?243  A court could find minimal artistic 
relevance under Rogers if the reference to Davis actually had something 
to do with the trumpet player.  An unknown artist might have difficulty 
establishing that he did not simply use Davis’s name as a marketing 
tool.244  However, if a music review made an identical statement, the 
artist probably would include it on his CD because the statement would 
be protected speech.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Lanham Act’s conflict with the First Amendment produced 
several conflicting tests to weigh these interests.  Courts treat celebrity 
claims differently than typical trademark claims.  The Lanham Act’s 
expanded applicability has led to cases in which consumer confusion is 
supplanted by celebrities’ property interests in their names and images.  
Courts balance these interests inconsistently, resulting in artists’ inability 
to use these trademarks in their works for fear of litigation.  Several tests 
used by federal courts include the standard likelihood of confusion test, 
the alternative avenues test, and several formulations of the Rogers 
balancing test.  Consistent treatment of these claims is necessary in order 
 
 242. Otherwise, the speech would be false and misleading, and the First 
Amendment would not protect it anyway.  See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying 
text. 
 243. See Greene, supra note 235, at 622 (discussing false advertising implications 
of a hypothetical pizza parlor displaying a sign stating, “Robert DeNiro eats here” when 
he in fact does not as a fraud on the public violative of the Lanham Act). 
 244. See discussion of potential bias against unknown artists supra notes 226–31 
and accompanying text. 
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to permit artists to create work with clearly defined boundaries, thus 
vindicating their First Amendment rights, while upholding the traditional 
consumer protection emphasis of trademark law.  By applying the 
Rogers test as it was originally intended, and applying the Lanham Act 
likelihood of confusion test only to uses that lack a minimum threshold 
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